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Rakhamim: A model of love and responsibility in the discourse of Emmanuel Levinas


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Melchor L. Cuizon
Central Luzon State University, Science City of Munoz, Philippines
e-mail: cuizonmel@clsu.edu.ph


AGATHOS, Volume 15, Issue 2 (29): 51-60, DOI 10.5281/zenodo.13937991
© www.agathos-international-review.com CC BY NC 2024


Abstract: Love is the most worn-out and debased word that humanity often utters. In modern times it is understood in the Freudian views as an instinct–dominated outlook whose function is instinctual gratification that is narcissistic and infantile. On the other hand, this type of love relation also reflects a utilitarian motive of using the "other" merely as a tool or means to an end and motivated by the maxim of quantifiable happiness or pleasure. This seemingly “love for – the – other” dominates the passionate aspect characterized by mere pleasure or genital sexual primacy, a “need-satisfying object”. In contrast, the true essence of love is grounded on responsibility “for – the – other” as the good in itself as proposed by Emmanuel Levinas. The absorption of humanity towards this “disintegrated love” lurks a certain danger, a danger as such. This paper argues that (1) “love without lust” is possible as depicted in Levinas’ discourse on “Being – for – the – Other” and (2) this concept of “love without lust” grounded on the “otherness of the other” is possible through the act of motherhood (Rakhamim).


Keywords: Rakhamin, love, responsibility, Emmanuel Levinas, other


Introduction

Emmanuel Levinas is regarded as one of the most renowned ethical thinkers of the twentieth century. Some scholars of philosophy labeled him a “philosopher of ethics” because he was the first to explore ethics phenomenologically. His notion of ethical subjectivity surpasses that of the Western tradition whose ethical discourse is structured according to the social construct, language, and ideology. Levinas’ ethics is revolutionary because it focuses on the grassroots of ethical responsibility for others, primarily grounded on the inviolability of the “otherness of others”, a living presence that cannot be denied nor ignored. This ethical concern “for – the – other” obliges us to respond and commit, and it is “these commitments that make us who and what we are.” (Marcus 2008, 8). By elevating morality to a “face to face” relation with others Levinas makes a Copernican revolution of the meaning of philosophy from the “love of wisdom” to the “wisdom of love at the service of love” (Ibid, 19). Thus,

Ethics is no longer a simple moralism of rules which decree what is virtuous. It is the original awakening of an I responsible for the other; the accession of my person to the uniqueness of the I called and elected to responsibility for the other (Ibid, 20).

If Aristotle regarded metaphysics as the first philosophy, Levinas on the other hand, regarded ethics as the first philosophy as opposed to the traditional view of being a specific field of philosophy. His recognition of ethics as the first philosophy is grounded on the principle of the otherness of others as the primary concern of any ethical relationship. This other as he proposed precedes any moral maxim or imperative. Although he acknowledges the importance of any moral system, however, this can only be valuable when juxtaposed with the “face of the other” whose living presence prior to the formulation and creation of moral maxims. This presence of the other cannot be ignored and whose vulnerability demands responsibility (Guenther 2006, Introduction). It is here as Levinas argues that the notion of the self is best understood as “facing the other” and called at the service of others. Thus, responsibility for the other takes priority over the conception of freedom. Freedom is understood therefore in the context of the face–to–face encounter with the other which commands and demands an obligation (Ibid, 40-43). The ultimate act of freedom as Levinas argues is the giving of oneself to and for the other. This responsibility for the other never exhausts because love and justice are infinite and this will always permeate as long as the other exists (Ibid, 48). This giving of oneself for the other in a theological perspective is one way also of filling up one spiritual needs (Ibid, 44).

 Levinas’ ethical subjectivity is a Copernican revolution of approaching the world for the subject as a precious burden from which the responsibility of the other (other – ruling) emanates in contrast to a world approached as a grand spectacle laid out before the subject to be enjoyed (self – ruling) (Ibid, 110). This his responsibility for the other is the grounding moment of love that transcends sentiment and mental state for it is an obligation demanded by one’s humanity (Ibid, 110). However, this love and responsibility in modern times is understood from the Freudian “libidinistic” interpretation of sexual drive that correlates with utilitarian ethics. As Wojtyla (2013, 47) remarks this understanding places the person as a subject that is “exteriorly” sensitized to sensory-sexual stimuli, which evoke the lived experience of delight. At this level, the person is disposed toward seeking sensory–vital pleasure resembles that of the animal instinct (Ibid.). Reducing love at the libidinistic level contradicts the very nature of the person per se because a person as a subject is equipped with “interiority” which directs him/her to dispose of one’s sexual drive with utmost responsibility and sensitivity in the presence of others (Ibid.).

 This Freudian understanding of love as an energy-driven model and instinct-dominated outlook lurks a certain danger. It is a love driven by pleasure whose telos (end) is merely self-gratification. A love driven by one’s libido that requires something in return, a love that invests to generate a profit (Wojtyla 2013, 105). This utilitarian motive of love grounded on the pleasure-seeking principle is incapable of achieving the true essence of happiness / eudaimonia coined by Aristotle (human flourishing). It is this happiness that aims at the good of others as the good in itself that Levinas pursues:

Authentic love does not mainly strive after union and fusion, it always respects the other’s radical otherness and cherishes the other as unique; love is not primarily characterized by mere mutual pleasure giving and reciprocal affirmation, rather, it is expressed as acts of goodness for the sake of the other’s best interests, often requiring self-sacrifice (Marcus 2008, 111).

This love as Levinas proposed is exemplified by the love of a mother to his/her child (maternal care), a love that emanates from the infant’s sense of gratitude toward the “good” mother, toward the satisfying, “good breast.” This paper argues that (1) “love without lust” is possible as depicted in Levinas discourse on “Being – for – the – Other” and (2) this concept of “love without lust” grounded on the “otherness of the other” is possible through the act of motherhood (Rakhamim).


Methodology

The method used in this research is interpretative analyzing and synthesizing important insights that are deemed relevant to the issue being explored. Included in these insights are some observations and personal experiences of the researchers contextualized in the recent discourse of the literature which attempt to explore the thesis questions of the study.


Love as responsibility for – the – other

The Levinasian ethics is fundamentally grounded on the relation of the self towards the other person whose living presence is inescapable and irreducible. In a book entitled Is It Righteous to Be (2001), a compilation of the series of interviews of Levinas (1982–1992), discussing with Francois Poirie, Levinas situates his discourse in ethics as:

A comportment in which the other, who is strange and indifferent to you, who belongs neither to the order of your interest nor to your affections, at the same time matters to you. His alterity concerns you. A relation of another order than that of knowledge, in which the object is given value by knowing it, which passes for the only relation with beings. Can one be for an I without being reduced to an object of pure knowledge? Placed in an ethical relation, the other human remains other (Levinas 2001, 48).

This face of the other is a sort of awakening that compels us to the responsibility that is neither negotiated nor even consented to by me. The face understood in Levinesian terminology is “moral consciousness” or “personality”. The obligation compelled by the other is asymmetrical and non-reciprocal in contrast to a love relation conceived in mutual utility that is symmetrical and reciprocal. This love and responsibility are grounded on being for the other, whose existence obliges the self to a never-ending responsibility. Here the self or selfhood transcends from an egoistic subjectivity of René Descartes whose center is the “I”, as the I “for itself” to the “one – for – the – other. This notion of love and responsibility toward the other is a possible response to the death of love in modern times. The face-to-face encounter with the other ruptures one’s existence commanding one not to hurt, not to injure, not to kill, not to be hungry, not to discriminate, etc. The face of the other is a person who desires not to be treated merely as a means to an end. He/She is an irreplaceable subject who has a desire and wish to live the fullness of life, a life of eudaimonia (human flourishing).

 However, the challenge of the time is also real; the notion of love and responsibility is reduced to commodities at the disposal of the ego. The secularization of sexuality of the twentieth century inspired by a Freudian ethos regarded sexual activities as the highest of human experiences, orgasm as a form of spiritual ecstasy, and redemption as an aspect of sexual experience (Grabowski 2003, 7). The sexual revolution which aims only at the satisfaction of pleasure and desire has only created an increasing marital problem for couples and promiscuity for young people. The reduction of one person and the other as the object of sexual desires becomes a threatening epidemic of many sex-related diseases (Ibid, 9). Sexual activity, thus perceived becomes a utopian illusion that cannot deliver what it promises (Ibid, 8). In addition, the consumerist attitude of humanity has expanded and developed technology that undercut the sense of human contact as the foundation of every social relation. Technology isolates us from the other while offering a new search for intimacy to fill the void created by technology—a search that often gravitates toward sex (Ibid, 10).

 In a survey conducted by the University of the Philippines in December of 2022 among Filipino youth aged 15 – 24, results show that 32 percent of male youth and 27 percent of female youth have sexual experience before marriage. Sex exposure in social media either intentional or incidental is the prime mover of why young people in the country indulge in any sexual promiscuity. This desire reduces the other person to an object of sexual desires and instinctual satisfaction that alienates one from the dignity bestowed upon them by rationality (Grabowski 2003, 89). The person reduced to the status of an object becomes a standing reserve (bestand) to use Heidegger’s terminology. That is the other is taken only at one disposal after being used and serves their purpose. In addition, this reduction to a person's disability is discardable in the sense that they are not only disposed of, but also deployed, or order rather they are discarded once their utility is exhausted because they are only perceived at the level of an ephemeral quality that lacks stability and permanence (Rojcewicz 2006). This fact can also be conceived on how one uses power over the other, which is not accompanied by a development rooted in responsibility, human values, and conscience for the other. The advent of technology such as information, biotechnology, economics, and nuclear weapons to mention a few has given humanity tremendous power not only in response to the demand of existence but use it as a means of annihilating the other. The killings and murders of humanity in the middle of the twentieth century because of Nazism and Communism juxtaposed the killings of millions of people from the war between Russia and Ukraine to the recent dispute between Israel and Hamas. People are senselessly killed by the increasingly deadly arsenal of weapons available for modern warfare. In whose hands does all this power lie, or will it eventually end up (Pope Francis 2015, 104)? The face of the other resists this possession or utilization as Levinas remarks instead, it invites and obliges us to take on a responsibility that transcends categorization and contentment. The face of the other adheres us to the fundamental commandment Thou shalt not kill (Hand 2009, 41-42). Love and responsibility for the other should not be taken from the alleged necessity of utility, self–interest, and violence but rather from a sound ethical concern and genuine spirituality for the other (Pope Francis 2015, 105).


Rakhamim (motherhood) is a model of love and responsibility

For Levinas love is a fundamental human vocation, a gift of being. It is conceived primarily as the responsibility for the other that transcends feelings, emotions, and even reciprocity. It is an expression of goodness geared towards the interest of others, interests that may even require self-denial and sacrifices (Marcus 2008, 111). This he expressed in the series of interviews with Francois Poirie for instance:

Love, however, is the proximity of the other the other remains other. I think that when the other is "always other," there is the essence of love. Perhaps he deplored it, but he also maintained in a certain way that the more other the other is, the more he is loved, or rather, the more he is loved, the more he is other (Levinas 2001, 58).

And,

I think that responsibility is the love without concupiscence of which Pascal spoke: to respond to the other, to approach the other as unique, isolated from all multiplicity and outside collective necessities. To approach someone as unique to the world is to love him. Affective warmth, feeling, and goodness constitute the proper mode of this approach to the unique, the thinking of the unique (Ibid, 108).

Or

Love goes further; it is the relation to the unique. It is proper to the principle of love that the other, loved, is for me unique in the world. Not because in being in love I have the illusion that the other is unique. It is because there is the possibility of thinking of someone as unique that there is love (Ibid, 50).

Also,

The responsibility for the other is the grounding moment of love. It is not a state of mind; it is not a sentiment, but rather an obligation. The human is first of all an obligation. (Ibid, 33)

Can the principle be achieved or it is just a heavy burden interim of love impossible to commit? According to Levinas, this interim is depicted through maternal care, an experience of a mother who is capable of living their love as responsibility for the other. The love of a mother to a child ruptures her entire being, for it is a love of total giving from whom the child as the object of love completely takes over the ego of a mother. The undeniable presence of the child seizes the mother’s egoism which is entirely consumed by the presence of the child. Thus, this love for the child is so intense that the mother is willing to give up and renounce everything for the sake of the beloved (Bloechl 2000, 31). The child evokes responsibility that reaches further than the life of a mother. A responsibility that cannot be measured in terms of autonomous freedom and cannot be founded in a free decision one takes upon oneself and by definition cannot be limited to what one, as a parent, has in his or her power. This love overflows with compassion in the presence of the child’s vulnerability (Ibid, 30-31). This vulnerability is understood when “the whole self enters into relation with the other as a being ‘for-the-other’—that is, a being susceptible to the other’s initiative (Irina 2018). This is the notion of maternity described as the nature of care in Levinas’ Totality and Infinity (Llewelyn 1995, 133). Maternity is a total being “for-the-other,” and therefore, a “perfect image of vulnerability in Levinas’ sense because of the physical susceptibility of a mother’s body to the ‘other’—that is, the child—whom she carries (Irina 2018).

 Maternity is understood as an act of substitution. In giving oneself for the other (child), one anticipates and is fully aware of the responsibility attached to it rather than a response motivated by an act of pity and compassion. Actual maternity is “the complete being for the other,” and ultimate vulnerability (Irina 2018). This all–consuming responsibility somehow diminishes the sense of autonomy as asserted by Immanuel Kant. For Kant, responsibility is grounded in the will that requires an active decision. Hence, responsibility for others is a choice deliberately made. In contrast, responsibility for Levinas is outside the will, for it is directed towards the inescapable presence and needs of the other. Thus, autonomy resides in whether or not one has to respond to this responsibility (Irina 2018). In the case of maternity, the nurturing care of a mother is evident from pregnancy to birth. The child relied totally on the mother’s nourishment and protection. Without this maternal care, the child can't survive and live. This is an absolute commitment of the self to provide anything and everything that the other needs as Levinas put it, “The self bears the weight of the world; it is responsible for everyone,” involved in “a responsibility without freedom” (Irina 2018). This is not to say that the mother doesn’t have the option to ignore the attached responsibility, she has all the reason to refuse, and however, the sense of responsibility can never be diminished. Thus, maternity for Levinas is a substitution; the mother is completely responsible, before herself, despite herself (Ibid.). Substitution in its clearest formulation depicts a self–sacrificing mother, whose radical passivism resembles an ideal ethical relationship in which the need of others takes precedence over the need of the self.

 After thirteen years of marriage, we are gifted with a beautiful child at the age of forty – four. The pregnancy of my wife is not that easy, especially in her first trimester. Every day is a struggle for survival especially for the child. Eating and drinking become more difficult for her since her body does not accept it. I needed to rush her to the hospital sometimes just to recover her from dehydration. The desire to have a baby at all costs is instrumental in overcoming fears and the risk of pregnancy. The thought of the child is indescribable and consumes my wife’s being for at last the long-awaited gift of the child has been fulfilled. The entire pregnancy was closely monitored by our doctor who treated it as a high pregnancy case given the vulnerability of my wife's age and her previous case of miscarriage. Although the whole pregnancy was a struggle, nonetheless, it went smoothly and my wife was able to deliver our child safely through the caesarian method.

 In this aspect of maternal care, a mother–child relation is substantially that of the mother who gives herself totally to the child. In feeding the child, for instance, the mother gives herself to the child without reservation. This is maternal subjectivity or substitution as Levinas argues, when the child, whom she is expecting, will never be an object for consciousness but only as the other (because it is also of the mother), whose possibilities exceed what can be grasped in terms of her own (Irina 2018). Here love and responsibility are understood beyond reciprocity, the offering of one’s property or possessions to the other, rather is the giving of one’s substance for the other (Marcus 2008, 113). Love is primarily giving and not receiving, it is characterized by “care, responsibility, respect, and knowledge. That is to love means to commit oneself without guarantee, to give oneself completely in the hope that our love will produce love in the loved person” (Marcus 2008, 121). Love, therefore, is an active power in humanity; it transcends walls and differences and aims at unity and inclusivity in the face of the other.


Conclusion

In a world where there is so much hatred, discrimination, and objectification which resulted in wanton killings and murders of humanity and the death of love in modern times which seems to be the revealing phenomenon of the period; it is high time to reevaluate oneself and his/her relationship with the other, a relationship grounded on ethical imperative. Substitution and responsibility in the context of maternal care may not be perfectly achieved or a mother may not perfectly fulfill the needs of the child, however, her failure does not necessarily brand her as a bad mother, but rather an affirmation of human limitation and capacity which she needs to strive in living out the challenge of the ethical principle (Bradley 2006). That is bearing the stranger (the other) as a nursing child, even if we do not have the reason or capacity to bear, the homelessness and exposure of the other speaks to us, inviting and obliging us to unconditional responsibility (Guenther 2006). This is ethical subjectivity proposed by Levinas, an ethics that does not consider only what I can do, but rather what I ought to do (Bradley 2006). This ethical subjectivity contextualized in maternal care is not only limited to women, this may transcend gender preference in a wider sense as Lisa Gunther (2006, 119-120) remarks “The maternal corpus, may or may not refer to the biological birth of the child because anyone can become a maternal body who can strive for substitution and work to become ethical”.


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