

The idea of sociogenesis of affective structures in modern philosophy and its psychoanalytic premises

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Abstract: The article presents a comparative analysis of both research in psychoanalytic philosophy and some philosophic strategies in the context of socio-cultural interpretations ('reading') of human feelings. In solidarity with the 'philosophy of life', in the framework of these studies, the existence of mental structures dependent on social circumstances and cultural tradition was proved. Therefore, human immanence should be regarded as a phenomenon largely caused by sociocultural experience, that is immutable, rather than as an 'autonomous entity'. In other words, these studies are based on the idea of 'sociogenesis' of human feelings or so-called doctrine of 'genealogy of the subject'. This is relevant not only to some sociocultural determinants, but also to the issue of possible psychic genesis, including 'sociogenesis' of human aggressiveness.

Keywords: aggressiveness, affective codes, mental structure, psychoanalytic philosophy, passionate love, sociogenesis

INTRODUCTION

It is well known that an emphasized interest of philosophy in the problem of the individual, especially in the study of the so-called 'mental structure', is core to its leading modern trends, namely phenomenology, psychoanalysis, structuralism and poststructuralism. At present, this interest remains great and might remain sufficient in the future.

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In terms of the philosophical stand on this issue, we generally refer to a dominant paradigm in philosophy, namely phenomenology. However, it should be noted that throughout the 20th century, there emerged alternative approaches in philosophy to studies of human psyche, which are not limited to phenomenological descriptive analysis and conceptualization.

First and foremost, we mean psychoanalysis of Sigmund Freud, precisely the psychoanalytic hypothesis on social genesis of feelings. Freud developed a theory of determining influence of basic social institutions on the development of the individual, namely formation of the moral subject. The essential divergence between psychoanalysis and phenomenology is due to the desire of psychoanalysis to find an answer to the ‘metaphysical’ question “Why do we feel this way?”, whereas phenomenology only tends to answer the question “What is this feeling?” without explaining it.

According to most researchers, a *sociogenetic approach* has become widespread in modern humanities due to the fundamental research of Norbert Elias, an outstanding sociologist and culturologist of the 20th century, who was the first to clearly ground the correlation between the features of societal structures and features of *affective codes (patterns)* generally accepted in a relevant society. We believe that modern philosophy is experiencing the sociogenic approach strengthening, especially with regard to ‘human affections’ that, according to Edmund Husserl, pose problems for phenomenological research.

In view of the above, we would like to pay special attention to the vision of the nature of human feelings that emerged within the framework of psychoanalytic philosophy, especially with regard to the issue of ‘affective values’ (Freud), since it is the ‘tradition’ that contributed most to the sociogenesis theory development. However, the hypothesis of a significant socio-cultural influence on mental structure as well as the thesis of its historicity, were first put forward by Nietzsche in his *On the Genealogy of Morality*. It was later on, when this hypothesis was further justified by Freud, especially in his reasoning with regard to the basic human passions, such as *love (affection)* and the *need for humour*.

THE AFFECTIVE STRUCTURE OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN *THE CIVILIZING PROCESS*

The issue of *affective values* or *affective structure of individual* became nuclear not only to psychoanalysis but also to the entire postmodern philosophical thinking. At its core, it is related to the problem of ‘designing the subject’, which many modern philosophers, especially developers of poststructuralist strategies, tend to discuss.

Norbert Elias was the first to reasonably bring this concept into question. In *The Civilizing Process*, he declares and argues that in the history of human cultures there were distinct affective standards, including the *thresholds* of aggressiveness and, consequently, different stages in the affective field evolution. By offering a sociocultural interpretation of human affects, Elias exercised a major influence on some humanities.

He refers to vivid epic examples from medieval literature, for instance, strong ‘affective outbursts’ inherent in medieval people, a particular ‘joy in destruction’, which was quite common at that time and, moreover, was viewed as quite normal. He writes about a knight:

He spends his life in plundering, destroying churches, falling upon pilgrims, oppressing widows and orphans. He takes particular pleasure in mutilating the innocent. In a single monastery, that of the black monks of Sarlat, there are 150 men and women whose hands he has cut off or whose eyes he has put out. And his wife is just as cruel. She helps him with his executions. It even gives her pleasure to torture the poor women. She had their breasts hacked off or their nails torn off so that they were incapable of work (Elias 2008, 35)

The author argues that at the later stages of “social development” and, especially, these days, the “original savagery of feelings” is considered as an “exceptional phenomena of pathological degeneration” (Ibid).

In addition to aversion to violence, there is another component that is also considered a very important marker of historical changes in sensibility. Elias refers to highly developed emotional standards in the form of some idiosyncrasies, such as highly developed senses of *shame* and ‘*repugnance*’. Both of them are quite effective mechanisms for internalization of the civilizational rules of conduct, which comply with a well-known imperative of ‘*comme il faut*’.

Furthermore, Elias emphasizes on the elite origin of so-called affective culture with a stress on its stratification character. This idea was expressed by Sigmund Freud previously. For instance, in his work

Crossing the Psycho-Social Divide: Freud, Weber, Adorno and Elias, George Cavalletto points out that according to Freud, “only the privileged classes are motivated to internalize external coercion and thus become civilized beings” (Cavalletto 2016, 14). The author argues that “Freud finds the degree of superego formation varies significantly between ‘groups, classes [and] even single individuals’. In fact, the concept of superego development and internalization of social coercion ‘applies only to certain classes of society’; whole classes live in conditions that discourage the development of superego, a fact ‘which is flagrant and which has always been recognized’” (Ibid). In other words, Freud’s socio-cultural concept was also based on the class approach, by means of which he attempted to prove that the development of civilization and psychic transformation occur unevenly and are due to the peculiarities of social structure.

It is noteworthy that the founder of psychoanalysis considered the human need for destructiveness as an innate human trait. In other words, according to Freud, it is in the human nature; social conditions of human existence only complicate these destructive needs, including hatred. For instance, in *Civilization and its Discontents*, Freud declares:

Men are not gentle, friendly creatures wishing for love, who simply defend themselves if they are attacked, but that a powerful measure of desire for aggression has to be reckoned as part of their instinctual endowment. The result is that their neighbour is to them not only a possible helper or sexual object, but also a temptation to them to gratify their aggressiveness on him, to exploit his capacity for work without recompense, to use him sexually without his consent, to seize his possessions, to humiliate him, to cause him pain, to torture and to kill him; *homo homini lupus*. Who has the courage to dispute it in the face of all the evidence in his own life and in history? (Freud 1929, 24)

However, according to Freud, within human relationships there is a space that demonstrates a specific art of control and transformation of aggressive impulses, which is realized in sublimation. We are mainly referring to Freud’s theory of humour, which was put forward in *Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious* and can be considered as a retrospective vision of another “episode” in the civilizing advancement of humankind, that is, as another “episode” of cultural “designing of the modern subject”. Freud leaves his passion for biological

explanation and demonstrates the presence of another origin of pleasure, primarily, the mental one.

Even one vivid example of taking pleasure in mental activity can be a proof of the transformation or social patterning of aggression, especially when Freud describes the very technique of *joking*. Joking is associated with a certain activity that “aims at deriving pleasure from mental processes, whether intellectual or otherwise” (Freud 1905, 70). However, the main role in this “pleasure” is played by libidinal impulses:

The purposes of jokes can easily be reviewed. Where a joke is not an aim in itself – that is, where it is not an innocent one – there are only two purposes that it may serve, and these two can themselves be subsumed under a single heading. It is either a hostile joke (serving the purpose of aggressiveness, satire, or defence) or an obscene joke (serving the purpose of exposure). ...within our own circle we have made some advances in the control of hostile impulses. As Lichtenberg puts it in drastic terms: ‘Where we now say “Excuse me!”, we used to give a box on the ears’. Brutal hostility, forbidden by law, has been replaced by verbal invective... A whole class of obscene jokes allows one to infer the presence of a concealed inclination to exhibitionism in their inventors; aggressive tendentious jokes succeed best in people in whose sexuality a powerful sadistic component is demonstrable, which is more or less inhibited in real life (Ibid 71; 75; 104).

Freud constantly argues that joking is a result of strict economy (“suppression”) of libidinal energy, including aggressive impulses. Consequently, it is easy to comprehend why exactly in the postmodern era, that is in the era of the “cult” of unlimited desires, the culture of humour represents a “sorry sight”.

DESTRUCTIVENESS IN LOVE

Meanwhile, in this article we are more concerned with the issue of ‘hatred in the feeling of love’. Putting it in the language of psychoanalysis, we are concerned with the problem of destructiveness in love rather than destructiveness in jokes or human destructiveness *per se*.

In fact, when philosophers discuss human affects, they tend to mean ‘passionate love’. We know that this human impulse was defined as Eros by Sigmund Freud. In his essay “On the Universal Tendency to Debasement in the Sphere of Love”, he directly points to the influence of cultural tradition on the characteristics of affective values,

especially on the specifics of the 'love life', which confirms the sociality and historicity of human feelings:

In times in which there were no difficulties standing in the way of sexual satisfaction, such as perhaps during the decline of the ancient civilizations, love became worthless and life empty, and strong reaction-formations were required to restore indispensable *affective values*. In this connection it may be claimed that *the ascetic current in Christianity created psychical values for love* which pagan antiquity was never able to confer on it. This current assumed its greatest importance with the ascetic monks, whose lives were almost entirely occupied with the struggle against libidinal temptation (Freud 1922, 5).

In addition, in this writing Freud points out such a phenomenon as *a psychical impotence* considered by him as a direct corollary of cultural *ascetic ideal*, which we often encounter in a so-called civilized male community. He states:

...we cannot escape the conclusion that the behaviour in love of men in the modern civilized world to-day bears the stamp altogether of psychical impotence. There are only a very few educated people *in whom the two currents of affection and sensuality have become properly fused*; the man almost always feels his respect for the woman acting as a restriction on his sexual activity, and only develops full potency when he is with a debased sexual object... (Ibid, 4)

Freud proved that there is a close relation between the man's basic impulses, namely love and hatred, although he was aware of the complexity of its comprehension. This close relation between human affection and hatred is already presented at the level of the 'Oedipus complex', which, according to Freud, mainly refers to the contradictory attitude of the child to his parents caused by a strong 'castration phobia'. However, in the case of 'sexual love' (as recognised by many thinkers, not only Freud), a destructive component within affection is explained by an essential influence of ascetic upbringing that can apparently cause hatred towards the instinct, a desire to 'annihilate' it.

Having analysed the researches on this issue, especially those in the field of psychoanalytic philosophy, we can conclude that the main reason, for instance, for perversion in love relationships is associated with a purely mental phenomenon, namely, hatred toward biological nature in general or the 'contempt for living' (Johan Huizinga)

apparently caused by the influence of the rigorous ethical norms and spiritual ideal. In other words, it is this hatred ('contempt') that provokes cruelty and the desire for 'humiliation' in love relationships as well as guilt for the 'libidinal temptation', which is vividly manifested in the perversion of sadomasochism. However, some further psychoanalytic studies assumed that the basis of *masochism* lies in an overwhelming sense of guilt for a libidinal impulse, while *sadism* is grounded on super-narcissism or *inferiority complex* generally compensated through power and violence. This view is shared by Alfred Adler and Wilhelm Reich, which can be found in relevant writings:

The first psychotherapist to propose an aggressive drive was Alfred Adler. In 1908 he published his theory that aggression is a super ordinate drive that dominates motor behavior and consciousness and is a confluence of other drives. It is innate, the organizing principle of man's activities, and (of greatest significance to the psychotherapist) can turn on the self, creating various pathological manifestations. Adler soon reinterpreted this drive as a masculine protest (a drive to compensate for feelings of inferiority), and finally as an upward striving for completion or perfection. In this later view, man was driven, above all else, to improve himself, to overcome. Aggression then became subordinate to this drive, and indeed, when directed at society, was a pathological form of striving (Rummel 1977).

Meanwhile, numerous writings in philosophy under review prove that there is no simple way to bring this issue to the close as well as there is no simple way for all representatives of the psychoanalytic movement to find a solution to this problem.

Adler's hypothesis of inferiority phobia as a possible cause of sadistic perversion, that is, of cruelty in love relations, was supported by Erich Fromm and Jean Paul Sartre. Both of them emphasized on a specific love of power, a desire for dominance, which is regarded as a result of an unsatisfied or uncompensated narcissism in most studies. Exactly this super-narcissism does give rise to a morbid desire for dominance in all senses possible.

It is noteworthy that Sigmund Freud suggested the idea of the fundamental role of narcissism in emergence of destructive impulses. Generally, he explained it by a self-preservative instinct, which was described in Erich Fromm's writings as well. For instance, in his *The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness*, he refers to Freud's assumptions:

Hate, as a relation to objects is *older than love*. It derives from the narcissistic ego's primordial repudiation of the external world with its out-pouring of stimuli. As an expression of the reaction of displeasure, evoked by objects, it always remains in an intimate relation with the self-preservative instincts;...The ego hates, abhors and purses with intent to destroy all objects which are a source of unpleasurable feeling for it, without taking into account whether they mean a frustration of sexual satisfaction or the satisfaction of self-preservative needs. Indeed, it may be asserted that the true prototypes of the relation of hate are derived not from sexual life, but from the ego's struggle to preserve and maintain itself (Rummel 1977, 441-442)

Erich Fromm only partially supports this hypothesis and emphasizes on nonsexual (sociocultural) origins of sadism:

Orthodox psychoanalysis claimed that a particular aspect of sexuality was common to all forms; in the second phase of Freud's theory it was asserted that sadism was a blending of Eros and the death instinct, directed toward oneself. Against this, I propose that the core of sadism, common to all its manifestations, is the passion to have absolute and unrestricted control over a living being, whether an animal, a child, a man, or a woman. To force someone to endure pain or humiliation without being able to defend himself is one of the manifestations of absolute control, but it is by no means the only one...For the sadistic character there is only one admirable quality, and that is power. He admires, loves, and submits to those who have power, and he despises and wants to control those who are powerless and cannot fight back (Ibid, 289-291).

According to Sartre, everyone in relations with 'others' seeks recognition of his personality, especially in love relationship; that is the reason for emergence of the conflict, 'denial' and even hatred as reaction to a 'lack' of this recognition. In other words, concern over non-recognition is the major cause of possible aggression in love.

The alternative explanation of affections, which, on the whole, can be regarded as a 'metaphysical' one, was suggested by Max Scheler, who believed that human beings tend to deny biological nature primarily due to their spiritual essence, and such an essence is inherent to people alone. Nevertheless, according to Scheler, denial and hostility toward biological nature are caused by spiritual aspirations, which *humanize* man's relationships in the first place. It is absurd to dispute on the fact that human beings are able both to love and to hate ('*ordo amoris*'). However, as far as human hatred is concerned,

Scheler was convinced of its conditionality by a “lack of love” and regarded love as a primary individual attitude to the “world”.

In the context of the above stated, we would like to draw particular attention to the study almost unnoticed by the modern scientific community. It is *Love in the Western World* by Denis de Rougemont. The author focuses on the metaphysical origins of human hatred toward nature. However, he views hatred in terms of ‘fatal Eros’ rather than narcissism. Rougemont follows psychoanalytic and structural logic *per se*, but unlike Sigmund Freud and Claude Lévi-Strauss, he points to another profound model of ‘vanished relationships’ in the unconscious that is not associated with the Oedipus construct. This refers to the “poetic fable of the division of the human being into two halves – man and woman – which seek to reunite in love” and the myth of ‘passionate love’, which, according to Rougemont, is necrophilic in its essence, that is, destructive. “Courtly love symbolizes a desire of death and advance toward death. But this is the death for the sake of love” (Rougemont 1983, 41). He interprets this myth as “an absolutely anonymous expression of collective or, more precisely, social facts”, in a narrower sense – “as a typical relationship between a man and a woman in a certain historical group – the dominant social caste, court society. This group is really long gone. But its laws remain our laws in some unexpected and diluted form” (Ibid, 19). He admits the idea of the dual origin of this myth, namely, its libidinal and social premises. The libidinal nucleus of passionate love consists, presumably, in the love of suffering. But which ‘historical group’ are we talking about here?

After a thorough analysis of the courtly romance, Rougemont came to the conclusion that in the history of Western culture one can find the motives of struggle between the two opposite modalities of love, namely between the ‘fatal Eros’ (with its desire for death) and the friendly *Agape* of canonical Christianity. According to the cultural theorist, these patterns may be regarded as an expression of antagonism between the mystical doctrine of *courtly chivalry* and the feudal customs, supported by Catholicism in the 12th century, especially with regard to marriage. In other words, the narrative of ‘passionate love’ is historically relative, closely associated with an ascetic ‘courtly ideal’ of medieval chivalry. Despite the fact that “courtly chivalry was never more than an ideal”, Rougemont suggested that the courtly doctrine basis was identical to the medieval ascetic ethics of Christian heretical communities, which were focused on the

religion of Manichaeism. Being grounded on the imperatives of *fidelity*, *exclusive devotion* and *denial* of sexual relations, it is the religion that influenced most the formation of the Western standard (ideal) of love relations, which appeared to be ‘fatal’ in its essence.

Denis de Rougemont declares that it was a completely ascetic ideal widespread especially among courtly poets (minnesingers), with the followers not recognizing any ‘corporal contact’ between man and woman. The ascetic-ethical content was just adorned by means of a poetic-esthetic form, and exactly this ideal was used in the medieval legend of Tristan and Isolde, to which he referred. He believed that this legend reflected an artificial construct based on negation and hatred toward life. In fact, this “courtly ideal” was an embodiment of “unhappy mutual love” that only meant suffering and, finally, death; it was a specific way of a “purifying desire of the spontaneous, brutish, and active elements still encumbering it. ‘Passion’ triumphs over desire. Death triumphs over life” (Ibid, 50). This fixed but historically and culturally conditioned structure is utterly relative and perverse:

Passion means suffering... Why does Western man wish to suffer this passion which lacerates him and which all his common sense rejects? ...The answer is that he reaches self-awareness and tests himself only by risking his life – in suffering and on the verge of death... It represents the essential disaster of our sadistic genius – the repressed *longing for death* (Ibid, 51).

Indeed, the end of ‘love affair’ is fatal: “Romance only comes into existence where love is fatal, frowned upon and doomed by life itself” (Ibid, 15). The basis of this ‘fatal love’ consists in the “old moral code with its aesthetic virtues ..., its spiritual and tragic values.” In other words, this is actually a story about the Fair Maiden, who always refuses. However, we lost all this long ago and are totally unaware of it; we are only left with “a dull and diluted pain, something unclean and gloomy” (Ibid, 25).

Thus, human kind always deals with such *main destructive impulses* of a human being as *aggressiveness* and *striving for death* and *hatred*, which are subjected to a dramatic cultural impact in terms of essential restrictions and transformations. These restrictions are actualized by means of both external and internal mechanisms. The internal mechanism that is referred to as *sublimation* represents an effective way of modeling high-conduct patterns that results in the fact that aggressiveness, for example, finds its social-adaptive (‘aesthetic’)

expression in humor, while the death instinct can be embodied in a poetic discourse of 'suffering love'.

IS IT POSSIBLE TO TRANSFORM HUMAN AFFECTS IN THE POSTMODERN ERA?

Meanwhile, the end of the 20th century saw an increase in criticism with regard to understanding of culture and its main formative function due to emergence of new cultural trends. The fact is that the postmodern stage of cultural development is accompanied by a loss of tradition and its humanizing function, which is designated as 'decoding' in Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's "Schizoanalysis", and we are again to address the 'gloomy' ideas of human nature suggested by Friedrich Nietzsche and Sigmund Freud.

Through "schizoanalysis", the authors, on the one hand, declare that culture is associated with a repressive system and begins with prohibition. It is culture that manifests cruelty and violence, or people have such needs (desires), since culture itself 'generates' and imposes them on human existence. On the other hand, some postmodern thinkers recognize that destructiveness is a constant human passion and the most primitive source of pleasure, which largely has the libidinal origin, enjoyment of violence:

...it is necessary to re-establish the equilibrium through an increase in pain. Nietzsche doesn't say this, but what does it matter? For it is indeed here that he encounters the terrible equation of debt: injury done = pain to be suffered. How does one explain, he asks, that the criminal's pain can serve as an "equivalent" of the harm he has done? How does one "pay back" with suffering? An eye must be invoked that extracts pleasure from the event (this has nothing to do with vengeance): something that Nietzsche himself calls the evaluating eye, or the eye of the gods who enjoy cruel spectacles, "and in punishment there is so much that is festive!" So much is pain part of an active life and an obliging gaze. The equation injury = pain has nothing exchangeist about it, and it shows in this extreme case that the debt itself had nothing to do with exchange (Deleuze & Guattari 1983, 131).

Critical comprehension of culture by many postmodernists, namely its reduction to coercion and repressive practices can hardly be correct in view of the fact that we have a number of scientific evidence of its creative role in mental and sociocultural processes. The creative role of culture was primarily argued by representatives of the sociogenesis theory. In addition, modern works constantly emphasize that

destructiveness is rather of an individual nature than of a sociocultural one. We believe that, the need for hatred or violence is hardly due to culture, rather, to its lack.

As for the presence of destructiveness in human feelings, the modern scientific community should answer the question whether the destructiveness is only a corollary of compensation for inferiority complex. If hatred is just a mental reaction to suppressions, a way of compensation for displeasures (discontents, sufferings) unavoidable in any society, therefore hatred always exists, is it stupid to fight against it?

Perhaps, “malignant aggression” (Fromm), the pleasure of hatred and violence, reflects mental degradation; in the past, culture restrained and transformed this ‘passion’, introducing some aesthetics into it, nowadays this pleasure is limited only by laws and virtual permissions. According to Jean Baudrillard, in the postmodern era we can see total domination of the symbolic way, that is, existence of certain affective permissions mediated by the creation of a virtual ‘ersatz’ of pleasure, primarily virtual symbols (‘simulacra’) of aggression. However, the issue of human affections and their historical mutability, along with the presence of the destructive constant in a form of hatred within them is open for further scientific research.

Moreover, Rougemont offered the hypothesis, which remained almost unnoticed in the postmodern philosophy but was supported, for instance, by Karen Horney in her reasoning on the cult of love or overvalue of love within the European civilization. Is not that the reason why we are constantly discussing the ‘Oedipus complex’ and are concerned with our relations and neuroses, which Felix Guattari described as “the abject desire to be loved, the whimpering at not being loved enough, at not being ‘understood’?” (Deleuze & Guattari 1983, 261).

It is noteworthy that the current stage of production evolution generated both a new sociocultural reality and a new ‘anthropological type’, which has resulted in the essential transformation of *the paradigm of human being’s existence*: at first, I change the world; today I am changing my attitude toward the world. I am only interested in my views and emotions (affections), but nothing else.

Meanwhile, Mikhail Delyagin, an outstanding thinker of modern times, notes that the way of the modern society transformation, its postindustrial development stage gives rise to different ‘meanings’ of human existence, contributing to the decadence of all cultural patterns,

including affective ones: people *en masse* began to consciously sacrifice their interests and feelings to strong affects (transgressive experiences).

It is satisfaction of primary needs that has made the so-called sensory hunger a major issue of society: nowadays, a lack of adequate emotional reactions rather than a lack of moral component is motivation for actions and, respectively, the marker of relationships.

The transformation of public relations, with the profit being the main ersatz of the existential meaning, leads to the only alternative – renewal of human being as an individual, which is impossible without restoration of daily public practices and communication culture within a family, team, corporation, etc. In fact, it is an extremely difficult task.

Human being is ultimately a ‘social being’ in terms of genetics, that is, he is *a priori* oriented to the ‘other’ or ‘others’, therefore the existence of ‘others’ is his constant need that requires a certain emotional experience. However, under conditions of advanced information technologies, both the ‘living human resource’ and traditional mechanisms of relationship regulation are actually unclaimed. The postindustrial production stage creates another society – society without ‘sociality’ (Baudrillard) in terms of absence of established and continued relations or ‘unions’ – this is the paradox, which will inevitably result in social collapse.

In a similar way, this gloomy picture of a new society is very vividly portrayed by another contemporary thinker, Henri Giroux. He argues that nowadays we have an alternative “esthetics” of reality, in which “super-violence” is embodied in the form of a “carnival crowd of creatures”. It is this “crowd” that foreshadows the emergence of repulsive politics, which has an insatiable appetite for destruction, human suffering and deprivation. Giroux compares modern politicians and their followers with zombies, when crowds of mindless “living dead” support civil disasters and cherish apocalyptic hopes, paying more attention to death than to life (Giroux 2010). However, the issue of human affections and their historical mutability, along with the presence of the destructive constant in a form of hatred within them *is most complicated in the field of modern and postmodern studies*.

CONCLUSIONS

The study of most Freud’s writings allows us to conclude that the problem of human passions corresponding to the so-called ‘affective

values' was his major interest, and Freud was not alone in this concern. Within the framework of both psychological and philosophical studies, the issue of love is almost always directly related to the opposite human impulse – hatred. Moreover, with regard to this issue, the entire philosophical thought essentially turns into a dilemma, the purport of which lies in the primary or secondary nature of hatred.

We may not agree with Freud on different issues, but his genius is obvious and can be appreciated for the fact that he grounded the ambivalent nature of human feelings, that is, presence of hatred in love (affection), of pleasure in displeasure (in humour), etc. For instance, a strong emotional attachment is necessarily accompanied by suffering, that is, the effect of opposite psychic urges within the same Subjectivity, starting with affective ambivalence in the Oedipus construct.

Within the framework of modern philosophy, there are several recognised authors who are convinced that *the need for hatred* is the basic and constant 'instinct' of mankind, and therefore the unchangeable aim of society and its culture consists in the *fighting against destructiveness*. Such a viewpoint is shared by Nietzsche, Freud and Foucault. However, there are many modern thinkers, who, on the contrary, criticize the remaining system of public relations, as in their opinion, it is society that generates destructive propensities or passions. Among the supporters of this view, there are Reich and Fromm.

However, after considering some ideas of affective values, we believe that the majority of prominent representatives of psychoanalytic, postmodern and even feminist philosophy seem to be inclined to extreme criticism of human affections (starting with Freud's doctrine of love as neurosis, to Denis de Rougemont's understanding it as "sadistic" and "fatal drive" neurosis, latent necrophilia, disease, etc.). Perhaps, this can be seen as a continuation of Nietzsche's denial of Christian morality that raised love to the level of the highest moral virtues. It can be easily proved by citing Felix Guattari: "at bottom, love is in the organs; at bottom, love is a matter of economic determinations, money" (Deleuze & Guattari 1983, 292).

We wonder which motives prevail in these doctrines? What exactly should be the main reason for their critical analysis or 'exposure' of passionate love? Is it their personal drama in relations with other people, since people differ in their affective propensities and experiences? Perhaps, these thinkers also depend on the current

sociocultural conditions and their works demonstrate the negative transformation of modern individuals. Therefore, all of us are really about to find ourselves facing an impending emotional catastrophe.

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