

## **Intellective Living-Experiences (*Erlebnisse*) in E. Stein and A.-T. Tymieniecka**

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**Abstract:** Edith Stein and Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, two women philosophers, in their philosophical anthropology delineate the essential structure of the human being, which is enlightened from within, therefore bring forward the distinctive living-experiences (*Erlebnisse*) in their essence and depth. The eternal and temporal modes of intellect are the insights into the logoc structure of thought that appear through the phenomenological analysis of both the philosophers. The intellective living-experiences in the individual and in different types of communities, in which human being lives, is marked out from two different phenomenological perspectives as method. These philosophers put forward also the question of metaphysical foundations of our reality starting from two different points of view but arriving almost at the same goal.

**Keywords:** essence, constitution, *Erlebnisse*, intellect, logoc, spiritual-eye, transcendental-realism

### INTRODUCTION

Human being as such is a complex reality and delineated through the phenomenological analysis appears in its three dimensions i.e. physical, psychic and spiritual (Husserl 1980). The first two dimensions are shared with the vegetative and animal world whereas the third is a particular characteristic of the human-subject as inhabited by an immaterial mode which forms and orients each gesture and impulse. A deeper analysis of this spiritual-world of the human being requires a methodological investigation into its universe and Edith Stein, a woman philosopher, a Discalced Carmelite nun, a martyr and co-patron of Europe, opens a new philosophical path to put into evidence intellect and free-will which move through intellective acts,

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constitutively eidetic of consciousness, with an attempt to describe their essential structure and associative connections (Stein 1980).

### TRANSCENDENTAL HUMAN SUBJECT

The transcendental turn in Husserlian phenomenology paves also the path for Edith Stein to investigate philosophically into the deeper realities of human being that not only questions the sense of the external reality, which manifests itself to the percipient subject, but it can cogitate the sense of his/her interior worlds and awaken it through analysis and freely motivated reflection on the intellectual living-experience (Stein 1980). For a coherent analysis of Stein's thought her attempts to work on the *Summa Theologiae* and *Tractatus de unitate intellectus; Contra Averroistas* of Thomas Aquinas, where she does not get directly into discussion with Averroes, must be considered an important counter-part for philosophical investigation because they delineate a particular pattern of her questioning the sense of human consciousness and along with its essential structure further is developed also its potential and active modes. In this direction the second part, chapters VI-VIII and the three appendixes of her later works *Finite and Eternal Being: An Attempt at an Ascent to the Meaning of Being* and *Potency and Act: Studies toward a Philosophy of Being*, build the metaphysical foundations of this philosophy of knowledge through phenomenological philosophy.

Intellectual living-experiences, like reflection, imagination, fantasy, memory, feeling, empathy and intuition, which constitute the flow of consciousness and are distinct living-experiences from what the five bodily senses and psychic impulses are, can be focalized with a concrete example that Stein suggests because it describes the three dimensional human subject and its intellectual perception of a sense of external and internal realities:

To think of something means to direct the intellectual vision to an object (in the broadest sense of the term) which is not directly seen by the eye. We do not speak of 'thinking of' when we turn our intellect toward a thing which is simultaneously sensorial perceived. However, I may perceive the books on my desk and simultaneously 'think of a book' which I saw yesterday. This means more than merely remembering. 'Thinking of' is an actual taking hold of or apprehending, and thus akin to 'comprehending' (*Begreifen*). I have either had some prior conception of the object and picture it now under the corresponding concept ('that excellent book which I read

yesterday'), or the apprehension (*Ergreifen*) is at least an initial step toward comprehension (*Begreifen*). In an indefinite distance I perceive something which I cannot yet clearly recognize, and it is precisely this indefiniteness which stimulates my intellectual curiosity and causes my intellectual preoccupation with this thing. I say to myself, 'I must take a close look at this mysterious something'. (Stein 2002, 328)

The kind of forms of the realities being thought of here keeps both the concrete existent and essential possibilities for the human intellect which are described not only through an empirical and theoretical science but also through the artistic intuitions expressed in poetry etc. These very modes as active and potential intellect are founding characteristics in Thomas Aquinas (Ghisalberti 1996, 203-232) and in A.-T. Tymieniecka's *Logos and Life. Book 1: Creative Experience and the Critique of Reason* (1988, 33-39). Both the scientific and artistic modes of intellection pave the path for creative acts which as potentiality to be awakened is rooted in the human soul<sup>1</sup>. The immaterial reality of human soul is the interior being and it can be recognized through its faculty to understand the things of which one becomes aware or conscious and to mold one's actions out of one's own self free-will without being conditioned by any other external or internal law, principle or even any ideology. It would be an awakening to oneself of what has been cogitated distinct from the act of cogitation and this way an originary ego emerges which after evaluation chooses freely the direction of one's words and actions<sup>2</sup>. This very human being is a besouled matter with his/her living-body, animated and

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<sup>1</sup> According to Stein in *Finite and Eternal Being: An Attempt at an Ascent to the Meaning of Being*, "we apply, for example, the term vision (*visus*) to both optical sight and intellectual insight (*intellectus*), because the insight is in the mind as (*analogically*) sight or seeing is in the eye" (2002, p. 337).

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 362: "There is thus an ego-life and a concomitant awareness that is not yet genuine self-understanding or self-comprehending. And we therefore cannot speak here of either *intelligere* (*Vernehmen*) or *intellectus* (*Vernunft*). For we speak of *Vernunft* only where there is found a comprehended inner lawfulness (*Gesetzlichkeit*) of being. On the other hand, where an existent is ruled by and behaves in accordance with an intelligible lawfulness which it yet cannot understand, we speak of a hidden or latent intellect. And we call a creature *rational* or *endowed with an intellect* (*vernunftbegabt*) when it can understand the lawfulness of its own being and can act accordingly. This requires *ratio* (*Verstand*), i.e., the gift of understanding, and *liberum arbitrium* (*Freiheit*), i.e., the gift of molding one's actions out of one's own self".

spiritual nature. Stein proposes here a metaphor of a burning candle that bears in it a potential light in the matter but that does not enlighten on its own; enlightened through an extrinsic agent, it not only burns but enlightens and warms the surroundings. The candle is only a material metaphor whereas the reality in consideration is the human being with its living-body, which makes concrete and evident gestures motivated by the essential principles that are comprehended only through the intellectual acts which are present in it potentially and can be activated only through an external vital and dynamic Source (Mobeen 2019). This Source in the immediate intuition can and may appear as an ‘obscure depth’ but the intellect through free will can penetrate its depths and describe its *telos* which can be the guiding thread to sustain the continuity of intellectual inquiries<sup>3</sup> of the originary spiritual subject (pure I). At this point the question arises if the soul is an independent entity or it is the living body (*Leib*) and not simply a material-body (*Körper*) The originary subject does not feel, think or act only as a spiritual subject but it’s a whole of animated body with intellect and free-will. In this very distinction one can pose the question of the soul present in other living beings like plants and animals that do not have a rational faculty which is a distinction of human being<sup>4</sup> who is aware of the external and internal worlds and can

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<sup>3</sup> See Stein, 2002, p. 364: “We have already learned a few things about the darkness of the human spirit. By virtue of its own inner light the human intellect knows about its present life and about many things which at one time were present. Its knowledge of what lies in the past, however, is fragmentary, and what lies in the future can only be anticipated with some degree of probability in some particular details. In its larger expanse, the future remains indefinite and uncertain – though conceivable in this indefiniteness and uncertainty – while the origin and ultimate end remain completely inaccessible. And the immediately certain life of the present is merely the fleeting fulfillment of a passing moment, instantaneously sinking away and completely disappearing forthwith. My entire conscious life is not equivalent to ‘my being’. Rather, it resembles the lit surface that covers an obscure depth, a depth which manifests itself in and through the medium of surface. If, then, we want to understand the human being-person, we must penetrate this obscure depth”.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., pp. 368-369: “It is important to observe what distinguishes life understood in this sense, i.e., the being of animate material structures qua animate, from the life of pure spirits. Matter-bound life is the coming to be of an existent, a becoming that must gain possession of its essence or nature. It develops on the way to its full self. Spiritual life is an ‘unfolding’ of essence or nature and as such the active manifestation of something that is already essentially perfected. And here we are once more confronted with an analogical relationship. The term life is not used simply in an equivocal sense, but the two types of life show some common constitutive elements of meaning (*Sinnbestand*). Both types are characterized by an

modify their succession of events by an evaluative comprehension of both the realities (inner and outer) and through free will can open a new path for the proceedings.

In constituting the essential structure of this reality which human soul is Stein gets further into its profound depths and individuates the “spiritual-eye” (Stein 2002, 373) which the originary I is living in the interior life of the human subject able of looking inside and outside of the living body. This also means that the intellective living experiences are essentially eidetic and as threads flow in the consciousness-being and awake an immaterial reality which human soul is. Through a particular living-experience, like trust, this spiritual subject can not only pave the direction of the path him/herself but be guided by a higher Principle which donates the vision of higher perfections and till the end of human life. The living-experiences of intellectual perception take the human being to a conscious feeling of oneself through living-body, soul and spirit where these acts effectively occur.<sup>5</sup> The spiritual eye in consciousness can render object one’s bodily structure, feelings and even thought through reflection. This will occur as originary I’s intellective act in which *cogitatum* and *cogitatio* can be looked at and seen into as separate essential realities lived by it. This possibility of ‘looking at oneself as outsider’ not only makes one aware of one’s

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auto-motion (*Selbstbewegung*) out of the ground of a thing’s or being’s own essence or nature. But in the one case the existent finds in this motion or movement the way to its own self – as something that comes to be – while in the second case the existent, as a perfected being, goes out of itself in this motion or movement, giving or surrendering its own self without, however, relinquishing or losing it. Both types of life a images (*Abbilder*) which in a more or less perfect manner ‘partake’ of the fullness of the life of Divine Being”.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., p. 371: “(Soul) mediates between spirituality and bodily sentient being (*Leib-Sinnenhaftigkeit*). The traditional tripartition of body-soul-spirit must, however, not be interpreted as if the human soul were a third realm interposed between two other realms subsisting without the soul and independently of one another. Rather, it is in the medium of the soul that spirituality and bodily sentient being meet and interwine. And this is precisely what distinguishes the particular being of the spiritual soul from the being of the sentient soul, on the one hand, and from the being of the pure spirit, on the other. People are neither brutes nor angels, because they are both in one. Their bodily sentient being differs from the sentient being of brutes, and their spirituality differs from that of angels. We have referred to these differences on several occasions. People sense or feel (*spürt*) what happens in or with their bodies, but this feeling is a conscious experience and is ordained to a passing over into an understanding apperception of the body and of bodily functions and processes as well as into an apperception of these impressions of the external world which ‘strike the senses’.”

actions and their motivations but can also evaluate their consequences and decide new patterns chosen through free will. In this manner the spiritual subject can choose a higher or lower life patterns according to one's own priorities. Obviously the higher perfection is obtained through a free choice of higher spiritual sense of life in all modes and material realities.

#### INDIVIDUAL AND INTER-SUBJECTIVE INTELLECTIVE LIVING-EXPERIENCES

The immaterial (spiritual) nature of human soul which manifests itself through intellective living experiences cannot be reduced only to this form of acts, even if they remain it's higher potentialities made actual, because it's a deeper reality rooted in the upper and lower dimensions of being itself. This essential structure is delineated through the metaphor of "interior castle" described by St. Teresa of Jesus where the soul as the vital force of the castle can move freely in each part and mansion<sup>6</sup>. No part of the three dimensional human subject with a living body is distant or unreachable for pure I which intervenes and moves through them at any time and any manner chosen consciously by it. The originary self with an intellective vision of the inner and outer realities comprehends their universals and through free will can make them evident and sensible for every other originary I as his/her similar, individually or in the community, potentially has the same faculties to comprehend:

The soul is the 'space' in the center of the body-soul-spirit totality. As sentient soul it abides in the body, in all its members and parts, receiving impulses and influences from it and working upon it formatively and with a view to its preservation. As spiritual soul it rises above itself, gaining insight into a world that lies beyond its own self – a world of things, persons, and events – communicating with this world and receiving its influences. As soul in the strictest sense, however, it abides in its own self, since in the soul the personal I is in its very home. In this abode there accumulates everything that enters from the world of sense and from the world of spirit. Here in this inwardness of the soul everything that enters from these worlds is

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<sup>6</sup> Ibid., p. 373: "The soul as the interior castle – as it was pictured by our holy mother Teresa – is not point-like as is the pure ego, but 'spatial.' It is a space, a 'castle' with many mansions in which the I is able to move freely, now going outward beyond itself, now withdrawing into its own inwardness. And this space is not 'empty', even though it can and must receive and harbor a fullness in order to become capable of unfolding its own individual life."

weighed and judged, and here there takes place the appropriation of that which becomes the most personal property and a constituent part of the self – that which, figuratively speaking, ‘become flesh and blood’. (Stein 2002, 373)

Even if the originary I of an individual or community is like moving and directing force of the totality of the human being considered in the question it cannot be considered neither the body nor the soul of the originary individual or community but it’s totality along with one’s opportunities, mishaps, education, culture, language and tribal group, and society to which one belongs, lives and in which one grows. In order to investigate into the hidden and apparent self of an individual one requires the originary subject (*I*) so that one can reflect on anything and only this way the constituent living experiences of intellect like reflection, memory, feeling, imagination, fantasy and empathy can be individuated as essential realities of the spiritual subject.

At this point the essential philosophical perspective is in agreement with Thomas Aquinas<sup>7</sup> when she affirms that soul is the form of body because it directs, orients and chooses through free will of the originary I the modes in which the material body can act and move in relationship and in connection with all what surrounds and is close to it (see Stein 2002, 378). Stein’s such reflection encourages an important question that if the unanimated matter is also in some way spiritual? Seen that she affirms that if there is an intellective relationship through which spirit is present in the surrounding and in the originary subject itself so it could be presupposed that even the unanimated matter, in contact with the spiritual subject, is a living space of the spirit itself. It may not be divine but for sure it is spiritual through the intellective acts a spiritual subject which human being is<sup>8</sup>. The intellective acts of

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<sup>7</sup> L. F. Tuninetti (2016, 157) notes: “Per conoscere non bisogna allora fermarsi a considerare il contenuto dei concetti, ma occorre partire dall’esperienza e sempre tornare all’esperienza. Non è l’intelletto e non sono i sensi che conoscono, ma è l’uomo con i sensi e con l’intelletto. La conoscenza intellettuale non si compie d’altra parte nell’apprensione concettuale ma richiede un atto ulteriore che è il giudizio. Nel giudizio ciò che abbiamo concepito si chiarisce e si completa”.

<sup>8</sup> E. Stein (2002, 380) writes: “Meaning and life are completely one only in God. In creatures we must distinguish between a fullness of life which is formed by meaning, and the meaning which actualizes itself in the fullness of life. Matter understood as fullness of life is not devoid of spirituality (*ungeistig*) but rather pertains to the spirit itself. Unformed fullness of life is a power or potency for spiritual being, a potency which must yet be brought to the perfection of its being. Meaning without fullness of

calculation and the modes of movement which is not self-governing of computers and other technological means can be considered consequences of spiritual action since they have the logical universal principles programmed in them by a spiritual subject which is a human being as technician, programmer or informatics engineer but they do not make spiritual acts since they do not have ordinary free will.

These technological instruments share the spiritual subjectivity of their inventor, they might be also considered a production of the creative acts of their author but having the lack of free will, its exercise in them and lacking of life-principle they cannot be considered a totality of spiritual subject even of a lower level.

It seems Edith Stein has not considered these possibilities in her constitution of the spiritual subject even if she describes the practical possibilities of the human being limited to a reproduction of material goods and instruments without any possibility of imparting a new life to them:

The soul does not have the power to form out to its own self – without the aid of existing material elements – a body (a spirit-body ‘*Geistleib*’) in the manner in which the Holy Spirit formed those visible structures in which it appeared to human beings (the dove and the fiery tongues), or in the manner in which the angels formed those human bodies in which they showed themselves on earth. Nor has the soul the power to impart to the earthly body the invulnerability and immortality which are promised for the life of glory, or to generate out of its own self new life and impart it to others. All this requires a divine creative power. (Stein 2002, 519)

The *pure I* envisioned and phenomenologically investigated by Stein (1989, 14) is a gate for the spiritual subject which human being is to become aware of oneself through intellectual acts which perceive and act through bodily and psychic living experiences but through free will one can also form oneself freely. The intellectual acts which flow in consciousness are not only individuated by the pure I which lives them originally, since through the living-experience of empathy other similars in spiritual nature can also be aware of them, but this very

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life is an idea which becomes actual only in something that is alive. Neither meaning nor fullness of life (which pertains to the spirit) has anything to do with spatial materiality. The life filled with meaning, however, is a superabundant, diffusive life. It has a form of being which we call spiritual (*geistig*).”



seeing of the immaterial or spiritual living-experiences is possible to see through the pure I which is a door to the *lucidity of consciousness*<sup>9</sup>.

Stein discusses the question of soul as formal principal of matter in the living body as material and psychic according to the determined life-force in *Potency and Act* and in a synthetic form to define the preamble already in an appendix regarding the argument. Whereas in a detailed analysis she shows in a deeper investigation that life is a continuous movement from the potential into act of the material and psychic dimensions but spirit as subject is the measure of being and of the vital force:

All finite substantial be-ings are found among these poles (1) pure being, which is pure spirit and pure act, (2) *materia prima* (prime matter), which is pure potency and of itself lacks spirit (*geist-los*), and (3) the null being of dematerialized (*enmaterialisiert*) finite spirits. Each finite substantial be-ing is a something that is partially actual and partially potential; each is matter, formed and thereby filled with spirit. Yet they all differ from one another in the measures of being lent to them, and so they differ in how act and potency are related in them as well as in what 'spirit' and 'matter' signify in them. (Stein 2009, 415)

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<sup>9</sup> E. Stein (2002, 501-502) underlines: "It has already become clear that the individual being of human beings – like the individual being of every spiritual person – differs from the individual being of all non-personal things. This implies that life (on the level of personality) emanates from the I and that the personal I holds command over it in a dual sense: so as to become conscious of it as of a life that is set apart from everything else; and so as to mold this life freely. But we have seen, moreover, that the I is not to be conceived as a mere pure ego (*ein blosses reines Ich*); that the pure ego is, as it were, only the portal through which the life of the human person passes on its way from the depth of the soul to the lucidity of consciousness. And the innermost center of the soul, its most authentic and most spiritual part, is not colorless and shapeless, but has a particular form of its own. The soul feels it when it is 'in its own self,' when it is 'self-collected'. This innermost center of the soul cannot be grasped in such a manner that it could be given a universal name, nor can it be compared with anything else. It cannot be divided into properties, character traits and the like, because it is located in greater depth than any of these. The innermost center of the soul is the how (*ποιον*) of the essence itself and as such impresses its stamp on every trait of character and every attitude and action of human beings, and it is the key that unlocks the mystery of the structural formation of the character of a human being".

## LOGOIC ACTS OF HUMAN BEING AND PHENOMENOLOGY OF LIFE

The question of life in general but the human life in particular has been a main theme in the philosophical system which Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka through an authentic method delineates in her writings. This approach of original philosophical reflection has been in discussion not only with the classical philosophers of each period but in particular she wanted to delineate a new path to investigate the truth about life and its essential modes so that phenomenology of life could be a light which could channelize the future search for truth as well. Referring to my last meeting with her in Rome, which became also her last visit in a city which she loved very much, it seems necessary to mention that according to her phenomenology of life was a whole life project realized essentially but which she would have liked to re-write on the questions she had been reflecting on all her life but at this point this task is entrusted to Tymieniecka's interpreters and critiques.

This new philosophical mode of phenomenological investigation concentrates mainly on the question of life in particular lived by the human being. Tymieniecka's main work in this regard can be considered "Introduction to the Phenomenology of Life and of the Human Condition" of her *Logos and Life*. Book I: *Creative Experience and the Critique of Reason* (1988) where she holds a new phenomenological path to "go back to the things in themselves" in discussion with some main classical philosophers and in particular underlines the limits of Husserlian realism which she considers a *radical overturn of the phenomenological perspective* (Tymieniecka 1988, 3). The above mentioned analysis of Edith Stein's phenomenological transcendental reading of the intellectual living-experiences of the human being as a spiritual subject do not agree with the five main objections of Tymieniecka to Husserl since they are rather a critique of his realistic reading of the cognitive subject (Ibid., 3-6): i. *antithetic position on reality which led it astray*; ii. *Sphere of human expansion remain extant*; iii. *ontic structurations of objectivity are not present in the cognitive constructivism*; iv. *Human being is not a meaning bestowing agent*; v. *limits of intentionality underlined in the search for world-order given by the human cognition itself*. Basing her analysis on these understandings of Husserlian investigation Tymieniecka proposes the objective *prototype of human action which resides in the creative act of man* (Ibid., 7).

### TYMIENIECKA'S QUESTION OF TRANSCENDENTAL

In the same text Tymieniecka moves towards a different direction and discovers the transcendental phenomenology in Husserlian investigation but this time she does not disagree with him but rather goes further with it. In this regard two main questions appear to investigate the *Logos of life* which not only constitutes life but orients the creative journey of human being in search of "sense" and the *self-interpret(ing) game of life* which is play *ad infinitum as the marvelous game of the intellect*<sup>10</sup>. This creative investigation belongs to the three main modes of human soul which are moral, poetic and intellectual sense and through them the *Imaginatio Creatrix* can take place for the progress of the life which belongs to the Human Condition<sup>11</sup>. This going back to the things in themselves phenomenologically occurs in Tymieniecka through Ingardian perspective (Gelber & Linssen 1991) and then the transcendental phenomenology as the constitution of consciousness appears where the evidence of one's beingness manifests itself to the essentially searching subject<sup>12</sup>.

In the perspective of phenomenology of life the quest of the knowing subject appears with a will to consider the objectivity of the real evident matter and the cogitating being which penetrate not only the essence of the known object but the knowing subject is known as

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<sup>10</sup> According to Tymieniecka (1988, 15-16) "In his enthusiasm for the constructive power of the intellect the occidental philosopher, beginning with the Greeks, has engaged upon grasping reality by forging intellectual forms and concept, the variation of which can go ad infinitum as the marvelous game of the intellect proceeds on its own, and has been seeking through the instrument undeservedly considered as privileged, namely the human intellect, as solution or solutions to the multiple problems of the infinitely expanding plenitude that is man's life in the simplest and most alien – because abstract – constructs of the rational mechanisms of the human being (in the principles and rules referring to an abstract entity or ideal forms), and has thus abused his privileged position as philosopher".

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p. 17 "... it is along the axis which these directions form that the philosophical quest stretches in trying to 'understand the truth' of the meaningfulness of everything there is, the pursuit of which gives to our life its own destiny".

<sup>12</sup> "First of all, the real individual within the context of his actual existence bridges the gap, otherwise insurmountable in Husserl's thought, between the empirical functioning of the human being and intentional consciousness. As we know, Husserl struggled in vain with his problem until the end of his quest and seems to have been ready to give up the initial project of the total hegemony of intentionality. Without it, however, that is, without bringing the empirical zone of functioning within the intentional system, no unity between the two realms can be maintained." (Tymieniecka 1988, 19-20)

well, and in this way the main question of the Occidental philosophy of idealism and realism re-emerges with a necessity to look for the real knowledge which remains a philosophical utopia:

As close as this investigation may come to the ways of coalescing and accounting for the features in which the object 'appears' within transcendental constitutive consciousness, it does not reveal its essential intrinsic structure, showing what he is in his own right. On the Ingardian analysis complementing that of Husserl, it is then the complex ideal structure governed by a nucleus of an essence which contains a constitutive nature that should account for the real individual's existential distinctiveness from other types of beings and his autonomy. To the degree to which the intrinsic essence of the being would indicate the necessary coexistence of structural mechanisms which allow for the exchange of externally conditioned properties, internal processes with external outlets are founded in the structure itself. Thus motion, action and interaction are 'ideally possible'. (Tymieniecka 1988, 21)

The ontological question of *telos* appears through the question of the real-for-me and it would not be sufficient to take it only as a subjective truth because rooted in the mere material reality it would overlook the deeper realities of truth which reside in all the existent entities which through intellectual work can be comprehended; through intuitive consciousness can be activated and precisely through the acts which are part of human soul with its spiritual dimension. At this point the transcendental phenomenological investigation seems to be necessary and Tymieniecka goes back to the Husserlian *passive synthesis* to awaken the interior world of the cognitive subject. In this discussion on real-for-me or real-known-by-me is analyzed by the author not only in Husserl but also in Kant who provides an anthropological terrain also from Husserl: "A transcendental theory of knowledge can be carried out only within the context of a universal theory of knowledge and this [only] as a pure science of consciousness." (Husserl 1956, 369)

Edmund Husserl recognizes the initial path suggested by Kant's transcendental investigation in Critique of Reason as a method to analyze not only the subject-object question but also as an intuition which gives a new light to delineate a new method totally different:

In fact, my adoption of the Kantian word "transcendental," despite all remoteness from the basic presuppositions, guiding problems, and methods of Kant, was based from the beginning on the well-founded

conviction that all sensible problems which Kant and his successors had treated theoretically under the heading of transcendental problems could, at least in their finally clarified formulation, be redirected to this new basic science. (Ibid.)

The transcendental turn in Husserl that occurs, as would see Angela Ales Bello, is rather a different query, because:

Turning to the question concerning the external world, if one examines the *Critique of Pure Reason*, it is clear that Kant does not doubt the existence of an external reality for the human subject. But he does consider such a reality in itself “thinkable” but not “knowable.” In terms of the *noumenon*, one finds three modalities that correspond to the three parts of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. At the level of the transcendental aesthetic one can delineate a reality that can be defined as “natural” and is the object of the physical and mathematical sciences. In the transcendental analytic the *noumenon* corresponds to the reality adumbrated by the ‘I think’, which concerns the human being and his/her soul. Finally, at the level of the transcendental dialectic the preceding two themes are taken up once again in the idea of the world and the ‘I’. Here the *noumenon* represented by divine reality is added. As it is well known, Kant concludes by maintaining the insufficiency of human reason to achieve the existence of the reality that corresponds to the three ideas in which *noumena* configure themselves, and he will attempt in the other *Critiques* to reach such realities. Hence, the human soul, God, and the world of nature and its purpose will become objects of a new investigation that uses theoretical means other than those employed by classical metaphysics, including practical synthetic judgments in the *Critique of Practical Reason* and reflexive judgments in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. (Ales Bello 2001, 135)

The Husserlian philosophical reflection about the knowledge of the world and the cognitive subject (Mobeen 2007) is related to the world of human consciousness and what is known by him/her through intellective living-experiences, oriented and motivated by the free-will which is not only a very important possibility of the *geistig* subject (spiritual-subject) but renders the human being really human. This spiritual-subject<sup>13</sup> (*νοός της σαρκός*) acts through the living-body and

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<sup>13</sup> St. Paul’s Letter to the Colossians (Col.), Chapter 2, 16-19. Greek version of Nestle-Aland and English translation of The New Jerusalem Bible: “Then never let anyone criticize you for what you eat or drink, or about observance of annual festivals, New Moons or Sabbaths. These are only a shadow for what was coming:

the psychic-soul concretely thanks to the originary pure 'I' of the individual-community subject.

At this point there could be an opening of discussion with Tymieniecka's reading of transcendental<sup>14</sup> in Kant and Husserl where she advances an interrogative: "The central question here is: 'Could man-in-his-world unfold completely through the productive and reproductive function of intentional constitution alone?'" (Tymieniecka 1988, 24). This discussion is through Ales Bello's reply to Kantian transcendental criticized by Husserl where she takes a different understanding of this question:

Here, the function of the transcendental comes to be delineated as the place in which one can begin to trace not only the conditions of our knowledge but also the deep structures of our being. The world existing in itself has a sense or meaning, which cannot be completely different than the formation of sense produced by our knowledge. But, here we are not dealing with a simple "cognitive image" that stems from the outside; and this because of the passive spheres of knowing through which material objects are constituted, as will be explained later. And this, if it is a position that contrasts with some realist positions, is also a distinguishing motive *vis-à-vis* Kant's reading of the very formation of knowledge (Ales Bello 2005, 135).

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the reality is the body of Christ. Do not be cheated of your prize by anyone who chooses to grovel to angels and worship them, pinning every hope on visions received, vainly puffed up by a *human way of thinking*, such a person has no connection to the Head, by which the whole body, given all that it needs and held together by its joints and sinews, grows with the growth given by God".

<sup>14</sup> Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (1988, 21) gives the grounds of idealism/realism problem in Husserl-Kant perspective also in discussion with an Ingardenian reading: "In the Husserlian conception we see the real individual constituted in his character as a transcendent real object by a series of noematic glimpses (*Abschattungen*) with which the perceptual process of consciousness fills the space s appropriately left empty within a preposed model. As close as this investigation may come to the ways of coalescing and accounting for the features in which the object 'appears' within the transcendental constitutive consciousness, it does not reveal its essential intrinsic structure, showing what he is in his own right. On the Ingardenian analysis complementing that of Husserl, it is then the complex ideal structure governed by a nucleus of an essence which contains a constitutive nature that should account for the real individual's existential distinctiveness from other types of beings and his autonomy. To the degree to which the intrinsic essence of the being would indicate the necessary coexistence of structural mechanisms which allow for the exchange of externally conditioned properties, internal processes with external outlets are founded in the structure itself. Thus motion, action, and interaction are 'ideally possible'."

Intellect of the human being as the main architect (Tymieniecka 1988, 330) of the subject-object reality operates through three main constructive faculties, namely memory, imagination<sup>15</sup> and will, which individualize life and its patterns for the knowing subject.

According to Tymieniecka's phenomenological perspective of life the very living-experience of memory is the vital force rooted in the logico structure of human life because it "appears with striking clarity to be a vital force with a double proficiency: first, projectional and concatenating; second, retrospective and retrieving" (Tymieniecka 1988, 355).

The logico activity of the human life organizes itself in two modes of rationality i.e. *vital/intellectual rationality* and the *imaginative/intellectual reason* and the second actually brings forward a new mode for the intellect to live freely and creatively and that is with the force of *Imaginatio Creatrix* (Ibid., 341). These two "*premier organizers*" as called by the philosopher actually, according to me, bring forward what is already there in St. Augustine's chapter 26, paragraphs 48 and 49, of *De vera religione* where he analyses the intellective growth of an individual directed by free-will, but accompanied by the divine grace, according to the exterior, *veterem et terrenum*, and interior, *novus et caelestis*, paths to be chosen and lived by the human being who is, as would say Husserl and Stein, a spiritual subject. This would be an opening of the metaphysical question which represents itself in this phenomenological investigation as *scientia transcendens* and there would be rather different areas to be interrogated also in Edith Stein and Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, which are in dialogue with Duns Scotus (1966), his *Tractatus de primo principio* and *Ordinatio*.

## CONCLUSION

External knowledge actually refers to the possibility of interior world of the knowing-subject whereas the interior world and its objects require different modes and instruments to investigate even if the cognitive operations are always constituted by intellect with its possibilities of being operative by the spiritual-subject. This very subject receives passively and actively the object, which *gives* itself.

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<sup>15</sup> Imagination as a living experience of the spiritual subject is analysed by Tymieniecka in discussion with Kant and Husserl, in a separate chapter (3) in the section 4, to develop the logico and creative acts in the "Creative Freedom", *op.cit.*, pp. 355-375.

This givenness of the object is constituted for the human being with his/her unconscious and conscious modes of consciousness within the passivity and activity of intellect which with its living-experiences can give birth to certainty and sense of the real of the object in question through its interrogation and it is a different name for doubt in this case. Even if the knowledge of the given-object will never be absolute and will always be essential but this very characteristic makes it a true knowledge of the known object, by the knowing-subject, true for the knower, and truth of the known. This cognitive process to comprehend the objectivity of the given-object and transcendental knowledge is according to the ontological nature of the human being which is with living-body (*Leib*), psyche (*Psyche*) and spirit (*Geist*). The known will be known through the intellectual living-experiences of reflection, imagination, memory, intuition, attention with concentration, free-will, doubt and empathy; at the psychic level the 'pure I', in its dimension of impulses present also in attractive desire and repulsive pleasure, of the spiritual subject, will be affected positively or negatively; whereas at the level of the living-body there will be a concrete material contact with the known because the 'pure I' interacts with the *other*, to be totally human, through the other two dimensions of the human being. Transcendental consciousness occurs through 'pure I' in the living-experiences of the spiritual subject that human being is. Transcendental knowledge, which takes place through one's experience, would need to be seen also for the pure spirit, animal and vegetative nature as well, but at this point it would require a separate philosophical reflection.

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