

FIDELITY TOWARDS FORMS: AN ONTOLOGICAL APPROACH – PART II

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Abstract: The paper opposes to a common attitude towards forms – as being something non-important, superficial, “formal” – Plato and Aristotle’s philosophy, according to which things exist because of forms. From the inquiry of their logic that mixes the epistemological and the ontological standpoint, the analysis goes on to the problem of the understanding of forms as events: as mirrors of the manner we see the world/as mirrors of the way of thinking. I contrast the *event* to the *situation* – in Alain Badiou’s manner – and I show that there is a logic of continuity between Aristotle’s insistence on the *concrete* face of form (*σύνολον*) and Badiou’s concept of *fidelity*: because this concept always relates to the concrete which deserves to be faithful towards. The value of things we support gives their “forms”. If so, fidelity towards forms is something more complete and suggestive than to follow essences: forms are as important as essences; this is obvious when the forms change but the essence do not; in fact, it is not a real change. The real change is when the form changes bringing also the change of the essence.

Keywords: form, essence, *σύνολον*, existence, event, shadow, surprise, fidelity (Plato, Aristotle, Badiou).

FORM AND CONTINGENCY

What was emphasised by both Plato and Aristotle was the *essential* nature of the form: not as if form would be unmoveable and unchangeable (as the old conception has asserted about essence) – on the contrary –, but as essentially constitutive of the existence. If an implicit conclusion of the entire post-ancient traditional essentialist paradigm was a hierarchy of attitudes towards essence and form, that is, considering the latter as “non essential”, as superfluous, random, haphazard, contingent and transient, the two great fathers of European philosophy have warned that forms should be treated in the same manner essence is.

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Thus, as the essence is not an accident, so is not the form. As the essence of things shows itself as the actuality of the potentiality of the *kosmos* (order) (Aristotle), or as the *logos* that includes actuality and potentiality, being beyond them (Plato), as the form is an essential part of this order, including both actuality and potentiality. The modern thinking of the 20th century has demonstrated that not only the form, but also the essence is the place of movement and change, since they are one. Accordingly, chance governs both of them, and reproduction – even though according to Aristotle, it concerned only the form, since matter remained always the unchangeable basis – concerns their unity too.

However, it seems man would need the hierarchy of essence and form. The unalterable nature of the essence, resulted from the overwhelming limpidity of the concept/*logos*, seems to defend the human beings from relativity, transience, lack of criteria, attacks from the accidental and the occurrence. If man does not arrive at the continuous, the stable, the inner causes and logic of development, he has no the *landmarks* he would cling to. And because the essence is difficult to be grasped, namely the problem of landmarks gives headaches, people are less sensitive towards forms than towards “essence”.

Or, as usually, *they confound the big problem of forms with non-important aspects of superficial appearances*. Forms are conceived of as being under the sign of random *eventuality*, while essence¹ – under the aegis of permanent *predictability*.

And since history has showed that the proportion of sad consequences arising from the *contingent* possibility of things was much bigger than that of happy denouements, people try to bypass the forms.

¹ Since philosophy is *au fond* a copy of the wonders and inquiries of the ordinary people, it would be interesting to research if and how these ordinary people do know what the essences of things are: for in many occasions they give the impression they do not know this. However, at the same time, philosophers give the impression that they are those who do not understand that which common people have already understood.

They were educated to be satisfied with shining appearances, and to neglect *both* essence (the essential questions) and forms. That's why they prevent an *unpredictable eventuality*, i.e. the occurrence of a future event: in order to not be bothered with possible alternatives requiring from them unusual decisions, they consider the habitual patterns of relations, behaviours and actions as constituting the very essence of society and human life. This very essence is equated with the *content*, another historical opposite to the concept of form.

The description of the human attitudes towards *form* – as contrasting with those towards *essence* or *content* – can not be realised “generally”. No phenomenological reproduction of the way the world appears to the human conscience is valuable in the absence of *sociological* paradigms. As I mentioned before, people are educated to trait in a certain manner or another that which would be essential or accidental/facultative/circumstantial in their life.

Plato's experiment or metaphor of the cave is valuable including for the problem of mutual dependence of knowledge (including through the forms of illusions, ignorance and “depraved perspectives”: Baltrusaitis 2013) and practical positions. Since cognisance have an obvious aspect of form – because information and meanings might be transmitted in *n* forms, more or less illuminating – and there are forms which divert people's mind from analysis/critique and from alternative standpoints, it results that the forms given by the emitters could be only shadows moving in front of an awareness that can not change the perspectives: people are feed with only a single type of information; as if people would be chained up in Plato's cave. Thus, to disclose this phenomenon and its causes requires not only an epistemological approach, but also a sociological one: just in order to understand the ideological character of judgements over forms.

And yet, as Plato and Aristotle have showed, form is not tantamount with a simple contingent configuring of the existence. If it would be, it would not have ontological sense. But *form is something essential*, beyond the random constituents of the real. Form is – as Aristotle has emphasised – that which gives actuality/presence/existence to things. Consequently, as later on Hegel cleared up, if “what is there is partly *appearance* and only partly *actuality*. In common life people may happen to call every brainwave, error, evil and suchlike ‘actual’, as well as every existence, however wilted and transient may be. But even for our ordinary feeling, a contingent existence does not deserve to be called something-actual in the emphatic sense of the word; what

contingently exists has no greater value than that which something-possible has; it is an existence which (although it is) can just as well *not be*" (Hegel 1991, 29), then "form in its most concrete significance is reason as conceptual cognition, and content is reason as the substantial essence of both ethical and natural actuality; the conscious identity of the two is the philosophical Idea" (Hegel 2003, 22).

Therefore, if form is not contingency but, at the same time, it is changing, how does it manifest as essence? If it is not a simple appearance, what is its ontological meaning allowing its appreciation as essential?

EVENT AND EXISTENCE

I link, through some intermediary steps, Aristotle's theory about forms and Alain Badiou's concept of *fidelity*. This last concept participates within the theory of *the event*, developed in Badiou's masterpiece from 1988 (Badiou 2007). The author has emphasised that: 1) the existence is/takes *place*² through the presence/presentation³ of *situations* (in terms of Sartre, 1957) people lie within; *situations are the configuration of things having certain significances*; consequently, situation is a philosophical *idea* (in Hegel's meaning); 2) but - in my reading generalising somehow Badiou's theory - situations are signified rather when some events appear/if these events detach from the "matter" of situations; 3) in fact, *things are events/begin by being events* and 4) their existence as such is depending on man's ability to grasp them, namely, to *cut them out* from the already existing situations which constitute the background that has already imposed a certain view about things, and to give to the events their entire weight. thus to consider them as *determinant* factors of new developments within the existence/ or factors of *bifurcation* within the existent situations. In this respect, the events are something *exceptional*⁴, which smash the ordinary configuration and succession of situations.

² Somehow jokingly, let's remember Plato's *χώρα*, *Timaeus*, 52a and b, the *place* where things are, or the receptacle of being.

³ There is an entire history of this concept of presence, emphasised, for example, in the modern thinking by Heidegger.

⁴ They are exceptional as the concept of *conjuncture*: "the singular random case" (Althusser 1997, 61).

The events depend on the standpoints of the observers: this is a normal idea at least from the revolution in physics made or certified in the first years of the last century. But making an ontological research, that is, searching for the most stable and basic features which would explain the principle(s) of existence, in fact the logic of Being, philosophers have assumed the usual procedure to develop it in an objectivistic *essentialist* manner. The construction of inferences and concepts seemed to be enough for this task. Marx was not the first (we saw Aristotle) but rather from the Marxian turn (following Hegel) has begun the *existentialist* approach, according to which man's real experiences and attitudes towards the world generate specific understandings and images of the universal connection of things⁵ and the existence as such is just how these images depict it.

Accordingly, we cannot describe the world as if we were outside it, somewhere in its exteriority. Consequently, just through our involvement within the world has it meanings.

Badiou is a follower of this existentialist paradigm and he has interpreted and, at the same time, surpassed the ontological difference between the world and us. He did this (in his book of 1988 he insisting that he doesn't discuss about ontology, but about the ontological discourse, through mathematics) by means of the concept of human *intervention* (see Marx's *praxis*) within the "static" – i.e. given – *situations*. Indeed, man is thrown in a world of situations. They constitute, so to speak, the "external" environment that has an almost absolute power over the thinking and deeds of man. That's why man can but subordinate himself to situations and, by doing so, he strengthens once more their power of determination.

Therefore, irrespective of the number of humans contributing to the situations and irrespective of the character of the individual as "generic multiple" constituting himself/ herself as a result of a complex and intersected praxis, the given/usual/exterior and implacable character of situations ceases when people intervene and constructs an *event*.

⁵ It is interesting to note that Heidegger – by assuming the existentialist standpoint with his core concept of *Dasein*, thus of the pattern of historicity that was, he considered, the common background of his philosophy and of Marx's (background missing from phenomenology and the pre-war Sartre) – has insisted that his existentialism is not that of Marx's (who explained the human existence with the concept of social-historical praxis), but an existentialism demonstrated on the level of thinking (Heidegger 1998b, p. 259).

In fact, “the fundamental ontological characteristic of an event is to inscribe, to name, the situated void of that for which it is an event” (Badiou 2001, 69). The *event* is a fact/paradigm that exits the daily routine/the existing situations/being (Badiou 2007, 189, 304). The novelty of Badiou’s theory consists just in the specific role of the event in front of being, in its *external position towards the given being*. “Being” would here mean the ensemble of situations. Only the situation appears as having integrity (*Ibid.*, 108), like the ancient nature (*φύσις*), remembered by Heidegger as constancy and stability (*Ibid.*, 127), or as “homogenous normality” (*Ibid.*, 129). Or, as Walter Benjamin said: the *historical continuum*. The event is which overthrows it. It is the novelty which always re-constructs the being. How? Through procedures of *truth*, i.e. within love, art, science, and politics, where people *decide* – thus not only knows/reflects the situations, but also take a stand in front of the meanings of the event related to its surrounding being of situations. “A truth groups together all the terms of the situation which are positively connected to the event” (*Ibid.*, 335).

But decisions are very difficult. This is the reason that both events and the procedures of truth require and, at the same time, impulse *fidelity*: a concept from the domain of love and designating the *construction of consequences of the event* of falling in love. “Fidelity... is not a matter of knowledge. It is not the work of an expert: it is the work of a militant. 'Militant' designates equally the feverish exploration of the effects of a new theorem, the cubist precipitation of the Braque-Picasso tandem (the effect of a retroactive intervention upon the Cezanne- event), the activity of Saint Paul and that of the militants of an Organisation Politique” (*Ibid.*, 329).

Consequently, fidelity constructs knowledge in that it: 1.*differentiates* between event and the existing situation, and 2.*transforms* this situation according to the event. The praxis of the scientific revolutions as substituting the ancient “normal science” (Kuhn, see Bazac 2012) is such an example of fidelity towards the event of the new paradigm that made its way gradually. The construction of knowledge implies, obviously, knowledge: for example, the knowledge of *ideologies* in society. But what is important here is that, although the ontological role of the event does not realise only through knowledge, but also through practical positioning towards it, nevertheless just this practical positioning depends on the cognitive representations people have about situations and events.

Once more: “truth is the coming-to-be of that which is not yet” (Badiou 2001, 27), or “the real process of a fidelity to an event: that which this fidelity *produces* in the situation” (*Ibid.*, 41). The *process of truth* is the result of hard confrontations of the existing truths and the new events. These confrontations dislocate or, rather, try to dislocate the habitual conformism to situations (as *faits accomplis*) and thus shape the attitude of fidelity concerning the odd event. “The process of truth stems from the decision to relate henceforth to the situation *from the perspective of its evental supplement*. Let us call this fidelity. To be faithful to an event is to move within the situation that this event has supplemented, by *thinking* the situation ‘according to’ the event. And this, of course – since the event was excluded by all the regular laws of the situation – compels the subject to *invent* a new way of being and acting in this situation” (*Ibid.*, 41-42). Indeed, the event urges us to no longer continue to exist in the usual manner, but to change, if we do not intend to be dogmatic. Accordingly, fidelity – as the attitude of *courage* in front of the contradistinction between the existing background and the event – is a *criterion* of both the real (ontic) difference between the event and the situation, and the ontological judgement.

Since in the habitual pattern of ordinary thinking only the existing situations would be „rational” – and hence “What is real is rational and what is rational is real”⁶ –, the *event* is that which challenges the usual rationality (which, sometimes, proves to not be rational at all). And since the event proves to be more useful – thereby more rational – than the old order, it results that the only solution is *to create*, thus *to accord our power of initiative with the event*. (Analogous to the new scientific theories forming a new scientific paradigm, towards the old one that has proved to have been surpassed/infirm by crucial experiences, and that must be substituted by the new paradigm if scientists want not to remain secluded within dogmatism.) And obviously, this creation involves also *de-construction*.

The process of truth is understood here as (rational) *construction/innovation* of knowledge/of the world of judgements from our head – having certainly a ratio and reason in the real, but no longer being only a simple reflection of the existing situations⁷. The truth-

⁶ This is the common “translation” – i.e. understanding – of Hegel 2003, p. 20’s formula: “What is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational”.

⁷ Plato, *Theaethetus*, 201c: knowledge (that always means truthfulness) is “true judgement with an account”.

making is a process, indeed, and which is never pre-determinate or sure, as in a mechanical and caricature pattern of the substitution of a truth/a model of behaviour and values with another one that would be the “only truth finally found” but in the same pattern. The process of truth is *indeterminate*: it has only *stakes* – the event, the existing tendencies within the real – and is based only on these stakes and the manifestations of *fidelity* towards the event. But, since there is never only fidelity, the process of truth could be suffocated and the truth mimics the “conservatory”⁸ understanding of truth as only *correspondence*, people aligning to the “truth” corresponding to the existent situations. Therefore, behaving according to the event means just to *inscribe us in the domain of the rational at a higher level*.

But what does it mean “to behave according to the event”? Would be this behaviour more truly than that according to the existing situations? Do we not simply consider it in a fetishist manner, just as others consider in the same fetishist way the behaviour according to the existing situations? Not really. To behave according to the event necessarily means to rationally analyse not only it, but also all the *alternatives* (for example, to annul the event and to return to the truth of the old situations etc.), as well as the possible *consequences* of all the variants: on short and long term. Actually, just the cowardly conformism is which does not trait the situations rationally: its rationality is fragmented and circumscribed within isolated areas, and in no case rational *all the way*, since this conformism issues rather from the illusions of a confident individual hiding within some niches inside the situations (which nevertheless are not considered as pink).

FORM, EVENT, STRUCTURE

First of all, the event is a form: a coating of some tendencies making their place within the existing situations. As a form, the event challenges man’s mind: to go beyond inferences (but, obviously, not without them), toward constructing the (new) situation according to the event.

Would construction itself be a form? It is, obviously, if we take the form in the meaning of Plato and Aristotle. Indeed, though before a construction people design plans, structures of goals, actions,

⁸ I put the word between inverted commas because it is commonly used within the political realm, but I use it in an ethical, thus philosophical meaning. Actually, in politics the word was borrowed from ethics.

outcomes, the construction itself makes something more than plans and structures: (ideal, material, relational, institutional, cultural) objects with definite qualities. Just these qualities (forms) make the objects to be the goal and result of the construction, and give the specific of the objects.

The structure is, as we know, a skeleton, a scheme, a simplification of a thing, a bone, a reductive image suggesting “the essence”. But, as a matter of fact, this “essence” as such cannot be realised without the forms in the meaning of Plato (as concrete) and Aristotle (as *σύνολον*). If, for example, we intend to construct a bridge, we cannot design the structure of the bridge without cognisance about the environment, conditions, specific tasks, material possibilities and alternatives: thus without designing *ab initio* the bridge according to all of these which require and generate a *specific* set of qualities (“form”) of the bridge. The essence is intertwined with the forms, actually it *is* the forms: Plato and Aristotle’s meaning should be remembered. Including the latter’s fine distinction between form and *σύνολον*. Because: our design of the bridge supposes both the abstracts characteristics of a bridge (the form) and the concrete transposition of these abstract characteristics (*σύνολον*).

Actually, although it was above deduced from Aristotle that not *σύνολον* is which gives the essence of thing, since it is only concrete and random appearance, i.e. not it is which has ontological meaning, but form, now that conclusion seems incorrect. Because again: the abstract form manifests through its *concrete* transposition, as *σύνολον*. Ontologically (according to Aristotle), we know that the explanation of things supposes only something essential, and that this essential is comprised of matter and form. But since things are only concrete, it results that the form itself as ontological concept *is composed of* the abstract structure designing general qualities (Aristotle’s form) and the *concrete* designing of the *concrete* unity between “matter” and the form of abstract qualities.

This concrete designing of the unity between “matter” and the form of abstract qualities is *σύνολον*. The example of the construction of a bridge or that of adequacy of medical protocols (the form) to patients (matter) – adequacy manifested through matching the protocols to the concrete patient (resulting personalised treatments/ *σύνολον*) – show: 1.the ontological character of *σύνολον* and 2.the doubling of the concept of form: as original form consisting of abstract qualities and as *σύνολον*. More: Aristotle himself has suggested that *σύνολον* is the

concrete matter; he has described this concreteness in the post Socratic manner of discussing about the existence through the relationships of words/names, but anyway a predicate is a quality (a form), and the consequence of this predicating is the *concrete* thing, *σύνολον*: *Metaphysics*, 995b: “by *σύνολον* I mean matter when something is predicated of it”.

If the problem of constructing a bridge is the *event* – that challenges all our cognisance about and related to the subject matter, including the sociological and cultural studies concerning the beneficiaries of the construction (and of the bridge), as well as the existing situation containing the missing bridge – then this event itself is no longer a reproduction of the existing situation, but it continues only some aspects/tendencies, thus forms of the existence. The *event* is thus *σύνολον*, not only form, and now it is clear that *both* have ontological meanings, explaining the real facts.

People’s attitudes towards the event are not single-string and unilateral; they are according to the ways this event appears to their conscience: as a beneficial or malefic thing, good or not, rather useful or rather useless, realisable or impossible, complicating their manners to think and worldviews or not, etc. And, since these attitudes as such participate not only to the configuration of the situations, but also are bricks of the event, namely, they are ontological features, in order to understand these attitudes as ontological elements we need to remake just the ways the event appears to their conscience. The *phenomenological* standpoint is thus auxiliary to the inquiry of the ontological functions of concepts.

EVENT AS SURPRISE

Though things are precise and colourful – thereby, translated into ontological language: matter + form = *σύνολον* –, to a new born child they appear first as a grey, unspecified something (“matter”). This something is the *situation* he lives within. But in his interactions and reactions, he gradually discovers the meanings of different specific facts/things: these meanings are that which give colours and real qualities to the former grey environment.

Each discovered fact/thing is an *event*: here the event is *something new having meanings*. And when these meanings are connected each other or the child/man faces these meanings, new meanings appear or, rather, the child/man marvels in front of the world. Events and the

world appear as surprising him, as a *surprise*. Just this surprise pushes the child/man to advance and discover more and more.

When the background itself has acquired meanings – i.e. the world of situations is understood, at least in some of its many structures, and when these understood structures allow the cognisance of some concrete *σύνολοι* – the situations themselves (some of them, anyway) might be viewed as surprising. And if so, they might be transformed into *events* as new creations/facts discordant to the situations. Accordingly, both the situations and the events are perceived in their concreteness, thus meaningful. They may be analysed not only with the ontological concepts of “matter”, form/structure, but also with that of *σύνολον*, since they are its variants.

Events – as *the new* somehow discordant with the existing situations – *are surprises*. But this meaning of events is not the result of only external processes towards man, but also of the process of *knowledge* as such.

This process is comprised of:

- *usual* algorithmic models, which rather fit at adaptation (see Piaget 1976, 18: adaptation is *one* way to not coming in fatal conflicts with the situations),
- but also of creation, invention, voluntary attitude, responsibility,
- *exceptional* models which mobilise cognitive structures and algorithmic models of understanding, but are more than these ones.

Inventiveness might be unfit, not abreast with the times, but it is that which links uncommon facts, and it is that which – just by its developing on the basis of relations, and not of situations/structures – supports creation.

Creation is related to *surprises*, it constructs surprising things originated from surprising facts. As it already was mentioned, creation as cognitive process is based on algorithmic models concerning linear processing within deterministic patterns (and reducing even the probabilistic ones to linear determinism), but it also arises from and supposes probabilistic models related to another psychical fact, the *will*. The collision between the psychical states, emotions – related to the will and which include and transpose *reasons*, *ends* and *values* – and on the other hand, the (lucid) evaluation of situations and events generates *voluntary creation*.

So, knowledge involves not only the process of sequential logical and mathematical operations – somehow taking into account only the

existing *situations* (data and rules) – but also a process related to the facts of *consciousness* which translate rather the surprising character of the existence, that is, the surprises agglomerated as *events*. Accordingly, the contrasts and contradictions between situations and surprising events as real stakes within the existence – though are related to the meta-levels of conscience (reasons, ends, values) – reflect also the knowledge processes and habits. However, the solutions to these contradictions are given by the *subordination of knowledge processes to reasons, ends and values*: after, obviously, deep unrest.

Finally, the “facts of science”/knowledge do manifest through the ability to express the reactions, relations, findings and images of the continuity and discontinuity in the world. This ability is transposed as symbols, i.e. *symbolic forms* (Cassirer). There is an evolution of these forms (which are in fact *concepts*), that can be grasped as movement from the *expressive* function of thought (*Ausdrucksfunktion*) generated by the experiences of man and constituting rather mythical and metaphorical imagination/concepts, to the *representative* function (*Darstellungsfunktion*) of thought giving fragmentary but as precise knowledge as the cultural tools/tools of knowledge have been constituted over time: forms that distinguish between appearance and reality and are given as propositional truth. Nevertheless, these forms are related to an “intuitive world” given by our sensible knowledge⁹. When the human thinking bows on all the “positivist” forms related to sensible intuitions from a critical standpoint, another function of the symbolic forms is arising: that of *signifying* function (*Bedeutungsfunktion*) dealing with the abstract relations freed from any concrete sensible element, this being “the realm of pure meaning” (*Ibid.*, p. 284).

⁹ Cassirer 1985, p. 282: “The primary task of the scientific concept seems in fact to be simply this, to set up a rule of determination which must be confirmed in the intuitive world. But precisely because and insofar as this rule is to have validity for the world of intuition, it is no longer a mere part or element of this world. Over against this world it signifies something peculiar and independent, even though this independent meaning can be manifested at first only through the matter of the intuitive world. The farther the scientific consciousness develops, the clearer this difference becomes. Now the rule of determination is not simply posited, but in this very positing is apprehended and understood as a universal achievement of thought. And it is this understanding that now creates a new form of insight, of spiritual perspective”.

This is an epistemological model. It emphasises that in the relation of man with the world, the *forms* representing the results of this relation – expressed by concepts¹⁰ – aim at being as functional as they can: i.e. corresponding to reality as both appearance and “essence”, this correspondence being at the same time in accordance with the logical examination of forms and their concatenation. The *reason* of *forms* is to be *true*¹¹. If so, it is obvious that the most important attitude concerning forms – concepts/theories analysed from different standpoints, ontological or epistemological – is the *truth process*, and that the most important attitude towards the truth process is *fidelity*.

FIDELITY TOWARDS FORMS

Fidelity is an attitude devoted to the event, while conformity is an attitude loyal to the existing situations: this conclusion in Badiou’s style seems evident. But, since not every event brings in more truthful forms – on the contrary, it could delete some true forms from reality – the position of fidelity towards the event is not *in se* a guarantee of the truth process.

In order to dis-cover truth from its state of concealment, the cognitive process should be creative: this means to *question* the existing forms/situations from the viewpoint of a consciousness containing free will and marked by free will; in other words – to relate the existing forms/situations each other as well as with their (logical and real) *consequences*, to *not see them in a fragmentary manner* and to *not neglect forms or tendencies or consequences*.

The existing forms have a strong force of framing and limiting humans’ thinking: they exist as some Procrustean beds. In fact, that’s why the *event* – as strange, new and shocking phenomenon, or as a yet unfinished, imprecise, veiled form – could be an ontological concept, together with the *situation* as old, usual, repeated, inertial, clear-cut and irremediably finished phenomenon and form.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 303: “For it is always the basic function of the concept to gather together – συνάγειν εἰς ἓν as Plato called it – what is dispersed in intuition, even things that are totally disparate from the standpoint of intuition, by establishing a new, ideal reference point for them”.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 284: “All concept formation, regardless of the special problem with which it may start, is ultimately oriented toward one fundamental goal, toward determination of the ‘absolute truth’. Ultimately thought seeks to fit all particular propositions, all particular conceptual structures into a unitary and all-inclusive intellectual context”.

But the existing forms could be more able to cause critique, movement and change than some new events. So which would be the criteria to judge the types of forms? These criteria are related to the *positioning* of actors *in front of forms*. The *reasons, ends and values* of actors are not only the surrounding environment for the forms emphasised by the truth process, but they are forms too. All of these have to be treated in the same critical manner, including all types of contradictions between them.

In this respect, the form is *surprise*: just as it is *event*. Only conceived of in this manner, have the Kantian formal ethics a so huge importance, including on the ontological level; only conceived of in this manner, the formal structure of *Dasein* is ontological; only conceived of in this manner, the model of man (*n* models over time) is an ontological form (or *figure*, as in the French expression).

If so, the problem is to understand the philosophical meanings of the attitudes towards surprises: i.e., beyond psychological and ethical analyses. Since every surprise is an event, that is in fact a *form*, and since although the event – being somehow understood, and “solved”/transformed into an existing situation – may transform into a situation, *the concrete human participation to these processes is as well as an ontological brick of the existence as the situation and the event are*. (This is the importance of *praxis*).

Indeed, *fidelity* – in pursuing the truth (by criticising, separating, evaluating, by manifesting the courage to not abdicate the pursuit of truth and values) – and *conformity* to the existing situations which might be not understood or considered good, but simply approved by the silence denoting indifference, are the *sine qua non* link between forms. And, obviously: rather fidelity than conformity, since the former is the active participant to the outlining of the novel truth.

Without *fidelity* there is no construction of the knowledge of the world. At the level of principles, to have fidelity towards the ontological explanation of things means to emphasise: a. that the world is not only matter and form – and the concepts would only reflect this (as in the old pre-Socratic doctrines), b. that the world is not only the matching of the world to concepts – as superposing of different manifestations of *logos*, c. but also that it is related to the human being and its infinite complexity – logical, psychological and sociological. Thus, the world is/the significances of the world are the result of all of these more or less partial viewpoints of the human beings. Consequently, these viewpoints being conform to values which are

pushing people forward or backward toward the process of truth, fidelity is always based on values. *Value* is an ontological concept, as the *form* is.

Yet why would *fidelity* be an ontological concept, as the form is? Fidelity relates the process of truth to values. But values are *ideas*: why would be so powerful the power of ideas? Plato has explained us: the ideas are *perfect* forms and man can but aspire to perfection, including and first of all by better understanding not only the ideas but also the perfection of ideas. Fidelity means to come nearer to the *perfection* of ideas: to always better grasp the significances, the ineffable *quid*.

Just the perfection of ideas allows them to be a fundamental ontological concept: this perfection meaning that the world/reality/existence *is* only through the translation of ideas and that the richness, in fact perfection, of ideas signifies that: a. the world is always richer than we can perceive it in a certain moment since the world corresponds to the perfection of ideas, b. we never can perfectly understand the world, and c. that the only *criterion/stake* of truth and existence is the perfect world of perfect ideas. We understand the world – or the world is as it is for us – because we operate with ideas, even though we never grasp fully their meanings/perfection. If so, “an otherworldliness” (Lovejoy 1964, 25) as philosophical pattern is absolutely necessary: the real process of truth should have a pole of *aspiration to perfection* and the permanent confrontation of the sensible experiences with the perfect ideas/intentions. The sensible experiences are, obviously, the battlefield, but always the sensible experiences should be examined from the standpoint of ideas: even if an experience or many experiences falsify a certain representation of things, the decision to consider them as “crucial experience” is always “trans-mundane” by judging these experiences from the standpoint of perfect ideal configurations we aim at and configure. The world of ideas is not “a glorified, detemporalized replica of this world” – as it was in fact in Plato – but the perfect “negation of it” (*Ibid.*, 38): i.e. the criterion, standpoint, lens through which we see the world.

But we are imperfect creatures. The “essential characteristics” (*Ibid.*, 25) of the world are found in the ideas: *this* means their perfection. And “essential characteristics” do not mean structures, reductionism, but the perfect/true concreteness. Consequently, fidelity towards *forms* is much more than fidelity towards structures: these ones are schemes,

but the forms are events in their concrete richness¹². The “forms” are *σύνολοι*.

Fidelity means just to follow the concrete perfection of ideas, to fight for truth. But, as we know, fighting might imply irrational feelings and harmful decreeing of truths. The *reasons* of fighting are that which give its quality. This is clear-cut in the real world. And this is transposable in the concept of fidelity: this one is *ontological* only to the extent that it includes reason *all the way*, the perfect concreteness of truth.

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¹² Also: fidelity towards forms is something more complete and suggestive than to follow essences: forms are as important as essences: this is obvious when the forms change but the essence do not; in fact, it was not a real change. The real change is when the form changes bringing also the change of the essence.

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