

MARCUSE'S ONE-DIMENSIONAL SOCIETY IN *ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN*

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Abstract: Nowadays, Marcuse's main book *One-Dimensional Man* is almost obsolete, or rather passé. However, there are reasons to renew the reading of his book because of "the crisis of capitalism," and the prevailing framework of technological domination in "advanced industrial society" in which we live today. "The new forms of control" in "advanced industrial societies" have replaced traditional methods of political and economic administration. The dominant structural element of "advanced industrial society" has become a technical and scientific apparatus of production and distribution of technology and administrative practice based on application of impersonal rules by a hierarchy of associating authorities. Technology has been liberated from the control of particular interests, and it has become the factor of domination in itself. Technological domination stems from the technical development of the productive apparatus that reproduces its ability into all spheres of social life (cultural, political, and economic). Based upon this consideration, in this paper, I will examine Marcuse's ideas of "the new forms of control," which creates a one-dimensional society. Marcuse's fundamental thesis in *One-Dimensional Man* is that technological rationality is the most dominant factor in an "advanced industrial society," which unites two earlier opposing forces of dissent: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.

Keywords: Marcuse, technology, domination, consumption, production, society, capitalism.

The book *One-Dimensional Man* was first published in 1964 by Herbert Marcuse. Marcuse's analysis in *One-Dimensional Man* is focused on an "advanced industrial society" or "the most highly developed contemporary societies," which are distinguished from all other societies by the level of technological achievements (*ODM*,¹ Introduction, xvii). Technology and bureaucracy in societies with a low level of technological achievements are subordinated to particular

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¹ The abbreviation *ODM* will be used for the Marcuse's book *One-Dimensional Man*(1964). Boston: Beacon Press.

interests in the fruition of capital. In these societies, technology and bureaucracy are “neutral” in the process of realization of capital. The neutrality of technology consists of its indifference to the variety of ends that it can be made to serve. In fact, technology in these societies is a means to make life easier for people, but not a goal in itself. On the contrary, “the new forms of control” in “advanced industrial societies” have replaced traditional methods of political and economic administration (*ODM*, ix). The dominant structural element of “advanced industrial society” has become a technical and scientific apparatus of production and distribution of technology and administrative practice based on application of impersonal rules by a hierarchy of associating authorities. Technology has been liberated from the control of particular interests, and it has become the factor of domination in itself. Technological domination stems from the technical development of the productive apparatus that reproduces its ability into all spheres of social life (cultural, political, and economic).

According to Marcuse, total domination of technological rationality in an “advanced industrial society” creates a one-dimensional society. For Marcuse, a one-dimensional society is a concept which describes a state of affairs without critical thinking, “alternatives,” and potentialities that transcend the established technological society.

Marcuse’s analysis of one-dimensional society insists that “advanced industrial society” needs more qualitative change than ever before (*ODM*, xiii). However, who needs qualitative change in an “advanced industrial society?” Marcuse says, “The answer continues to be the same: by the society as a whole, for every one of its members “(*ODM*, xiii).² The starting targets of Marcuse’s criticism of “advanced industrial society” are two basic classes which face each other in the society: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. However, the high degree of technological progress unites these two formerly classes as antagonistic (*ODM*, xii, xiii). Technology does this by creating an “affluent society.” People become the passive instrument in the technological dominating system when their needs are satisfied. Their reason for objection has disappeared.

² From my perspective, it is unclear why Marcuse thinks that the capitalist, the producer needs a qualitative social change? The capitalist enjoys and controls the work of the proletariat.

Based upon this consideration, in this paper, I will examine Marcuse's ideas of "the new forms of control," which creates a one-dimensional society. Marcuse's fundamental thesis in *One-Dimensional Man* is that technological rationality is the most dominant factor in an "advanced industrial society," which unites two earlier opposing forces of dissent: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.

Nowadays, Marcuse's main book *One-Dimensional Man* is almost obsolete, or rather passé. However, there are reasons to renew the reading of his book because of "the crisis of capitalism,"³ and the prevailing framework of technological domination in "advanced industrial society" in which we live today.

TECHNOLOGY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF DOMINATION

Before elucidating the role of technology in an "advanced industrial society," I will explain the meaning of this kind of society, or an "affluent society," in Marcuse's account. In the book *Negations*, Marcuse describes the meaning of an "affluent society," which has been compared to the contemporary American society (Marcuse, 1968, 248). According to Marcuse, the main characteristics of an "affluent society" are:

1. "An abundant industrial and technical capacity which is to a great extent spent in the production and distribution of luxury goods, gadgets, waste, planned obsolescence, military or semi military equipment;"
2. A rising standard of living;
3. A high degree of economic and political power combined with a government intervention in economy, and
4. Scientific and pseudoscientific investigation of private and group behavior for commercial and political purposes (Marcuse, 1968, 248).

In *One-Dimensional Man*, Marcuse's theory of "advanced industrial society" very often refers to "advanced capitalism," and almost all of

³ The term "the crisis of capitalism" in the Marxian theory means the collapse of capitalism and triumph of socialism. Unlike socialism, capitalism in various crises builds a new stratagem for surviving such as imperialism, globalization, state capitalism, multinational capitalism, etc. See Douglas, Kellner (2004). "Herbert Marcuse's Reconstruction of Marxism." *Critical Theory*. Vol. I. Edited by David Rasmussen and James Swindal, London: Sage Publications, p.385.

his examples come from analysis of US society.⁴ He rarely gives specific references because all the material is assembled and described in the sociological and psychological literature on technology, scientific management, the character of industrial labor, etc (*ODM*, xvii). A limitation of his book is the lack of evidence for his theoretical analysis of “advanced industrial society.” In this context, he says: “Perhaps the most telling evidence can be obtained by simply looking at television or listening to the AM radio for one consecutive hour for a couple of days, not shutting off the commercials, and now and then switching the station” (*ODM*, xvii).⁵

Ultimately, one can pose the question: What is technology for Marcuse? Technology is machines and industry: “Technology, as a mode of production, as the totality of instruments, devices and contrivances which characterize the machine age is thus at the same time a mode of organizing and perpetuating (or changing) social relationships, a manifestation of prevalent thought and behavior patterns, an instrument for control and domination”⁶. Likewise Marcuse, Heidegger also argues that a technique has an instrumental function as a means to achieve practical goals. However, Heidegger is not interested in an instrumental character of technique because it does not give us an answer on question about the essence of technique.⁷

⁴ See *Praxis* (1965), Vol. 1, nos. 2/3, pp. 377-387 as to whether the US is or is not the main example of “advanced industrial society” in an exchange between Mallet and Marcuse.

⁵ Douglas Kellner in his book *Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism* claims that Marcuse uses this material only to develop a theory of advanced capitalism: “I would suggest that he draws on this material primarily to support his own conception, emanating from post-1940s critical theory, of the technical world and administered society. His students during this period claim that Marcuse rarely discussed the texts of social scientists, except as illustrations of his own ideas, and therefore primarily used the analyses of C. Wright Mills, Daniel Bell, Vance Packard and others to support his own theory of contemporary society” (241).

⁶ Herbert Marcuse (1998). *Technology, War and Fascism*, Edited by Douglas Kellner. New York: Routledge, p.41.

⁷ Wolfgang Schirmacher (1980). *Ereignis Technik. Heidegger und die Frage der Technik*, Hamburg. For Heidegger, the question of technique is correlated to the phenomena *poiesis* (production; German: “das Hervorbringen”). *Poiesis* is not only a production, but also a *physis* (“a nature”). The question of technique, Heidegger investigates in the context of *techne* and *poiesis*. *Techne* belongs to *poiesis* itself through “Die Entbergung” (“the disclosure in”). Or rather, *techne* is a way of embodying *alethei* (“a true”). However, Heidegger distinguishes the terms *techne* and technique. According to Heidegger, a technique is only remembering of *techne*. A technique is also a way of “Die Entbergung,” but in the sense of “Die

Now we can return to the Marcuse's crucial problem, and that is the problem of technological domination in "advanced industrial society." Marcuse's first discussion of technological domination lies in his essay "Some Social Implications of Modern Technology," which was published during the Second World War (1941).⁸ According to Marcuse, National Socialism as an example of mechanized economy used technological efficiency in production to help secure "totalitarian oppression." In the essay "Some Social Implications of Modern Technology," Marcuse says: "National Socialism is a striking example of the ways in which a highly rationalized and mechanized economy with the utmost efficiency in production can also operate in the interest of totalitarian oppression and continued scarcity. The Third Reich is indeed a form of 'technocracy': the technical considerations of imperialistic efficiency and rationality supersede the traditional standards of profitability and general welfare. In National Socialist Germany, the reign of terror is sustained not only by brute force which is foreign to technology but also by the ingenious manipulation of the power inherent in technology: the intensification of labor, propaganda, the training of youths and workers, the organization of the governmental, industrial and party bureaucracy – all of which constitute the daily implements or terror – follow the lines of greatest technological efficiency" (Marcuse, 1998, 41, 42).

When Marcuse assigned The Third Reich as a "technocracy," he did not propose that The Third Reich was governed by scientists and engineers. In Fascist Germany, "technocracy" was "a partial factor" which was determined by "technics," the technical apparatus of industry, military, communication, transportation, etc: "In this article, technology is taken as a social process in which technics proper (that is, the technical apparatus of industry, transportation, communication) is but a partial factor" (Marcuse, 1998, 41). In other words, technology in Fascist Germany was not neutral, but also was not a factor of domination in itself. Technology in Fascist Germany became the first

Herausforderung" ("the challenge"). This character of "Die Herausforderung" is reflected through the growth of the production, industry and market. Modern technology "challenges" a nature to deliver energy which people can use and accumulate.

⁸ The essay "Some Social Implications of Modern Technology" by Herbert Marcuse was first published in the Institute journal *Studies in Philosophy and Social Science* 9, 3 (1941), pp.414-439.

time a form of control and manipulation of human actions by “brute force [politics] which is foreign to technology” (Marcuse, 1998, 41).

In the *ODM*, Marcuse determines technology as “an instrument for control and domination.” He says: “Technology serves to institute new, more effective, and more pleasant forms of social control and social cohesion. Technology as such cannot be isolated from the use to which it is put; the technological society is a system of domination which operates already in the concept and construction of techniques” (*ODM*, xvi).

From Marcuse’s view, the production of goods, construction of machines and airplanes, administration in the industrial system of labor and management are based on the technology. The new technological model of control is associated with the institutionalization of technical development. For Marcuse, technology itself is methodical, scientific and calculated, but not a political domination: “domination is dependent only on the capacity and drive to maintain and extend the apparatus as a whole.”⁹ On the contrary, Habermas argues that the technical reason of a social system does not lose its political content.¹⁰ According to Habermas, Marcuse has difficulties to determine the rationality embodied in the system of rational action to the proportions of a “historical totality” of a world.

In Habermas interpretation of Marcuse’s view, domination is “rational” in a sense that the system maintains the growth of the forces of production: “Domination is rational in that a system can be maintained which can allow itself to make the growth of the forces of production, coupled with scientific and technical progress, the basis of its legitimation although, at the same time, the level of the productive forces constitutes a potential in relation to which “the renunciations and burdens placed on individuals seem more and more unnecessary and irrational.”¹¹ Habermas notices one ambiguity in Marcuse’s own conception. If Marcuse considers a cohesion of technology and domination as a world “project,” then social emancipation has to be conceived with a “revolutionary transformation of science and technology themselves.”¹² In this context, Habermas says: “The view

⁹ Herbert Marcuse (1970). “Freedom and Freud’s Theory of the Instincts” in *Five Lectures*, Boston, p.16.

¹⁰ Jürgen Habermas (1970). *Toward a Rational Society*, Boston: Beacon Press, p.82.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p.83.

¹² *Ibid.*, p.85. This Habermas reflection derives from this Marcuse’s statement: “The point which I am trying to make is that science, by virtue of its own method and

point of possible technical control would be replaced by one of preserving, fostering, and realizing the potentialities of nature: ‘there are two kinds of mastery: a repressive and a liberating one’... This is a sobering consideration because technology, if based at all on a project, can only be traced back to a ‘project’ of the human species *as a whole*, and not to one that could be historically surpassed.”¹³

For Marcuse, unlike Fascist Germany, technology in “advanced industrial society” can no longer maintain the “neutrality;” it cannot be isolated “from the use to which it is put.” Technology shapes and “swallows up” the entire universe of intellectual and material culture (politics, economy, culture) (*ODM*, xvi). In fact, when Marcuse talks about technological rationality, he refers to the productive apparatus in the broadest possible sense: all spheres of life are included. The productivity and efficiency of the system stabilizes the society and leads the technological progress toward domination. From Marcuse’s standpoint, an “advanced industrial society” is highly rational in its capacity to become richer and better in consummation and utilization of technological resources. However, it becomes irrational when technology is subordinated to the established system. Or rather, it becomes irrational when the success of these efforts opens up new dimensions of society. This is the internal contradiction of this civilization: the irrational element in its rationality. In this context, Marcuse says: “The most advanced areas of industrial society exhibit throughout these two features: a trend toward consummation of technological rationality, and intensive efforts to contain this trend within the established institutions. The industrial society which makes technology and science its own is organized for the ever – more – effective domination of man and nature, for the ever – more – effective utilization of its resources. It becomes irrational when the success of these efforts opens new dimensions of human realization” (*ODM*, 17).

The consequence of this aspect of technological rationality in its irrationality is that the individual becomes a willing subject of the technological domination. The individual identifies himself with his society. This kind of identification is not adjustment to the technological domination, but *mimesis*, i.e., immediate identification as the product of a scientific – technological organization. Technological

concepts, has projected and promoted a universe in which the domination of nature has remained linked to the domination of man- a link which tends to be fatal to this universe as a whole” (Jürgen Habermas, *op.cit.*, p.166).

¹³ Ibid., pp. 86-87.

productivity and efficiency create a promise of a better living. The individuals identify themselves by their commodities; they find their sense of life in technological innovations such as automobiles, hi-fi sets, computers, and split – level homes. If the individuals find themselves with these technological innovations which shape their lives, they will do that by accepting the technological domination as a whole. However, if the individuals refuse to be subordinated to these technological inventions, they become “neurotic and impotent” (*ODM*, 9). In this kind of technological society, there is only one dimension, and “it is everywhere and in all forms” (*ODM*, 11). The technological apparatus of production and distribution imposes the system of domination as a whole. Nowadays the technological domination in a digital technological era is more expanded than in the past. Sophisticated techniques for surveillance and monitoring, the means of mass communication such as internet, television, iPod, and iPhone, and the genetic control of individuals among others are evidence how technology brings society under domination in more repressive way. People are more dependent on technological gadgets and inventions in today’s ordinary life than in Marcuse’s life time. The means of mass communication and transportation, the entertainment and information industry, carry with them habits and attitudes that they give to the whole society. The products indoctrinate and manipulate the passive consumers. When the products become available to more people in more social classes, the indoctrination becomes a way of life. For instance, mass production of chewing gum has become “a way of life” (*ODM*, 12). If more people use chewing gum in more social classes, a chewing gum becomes a way of life. In other words, if more people use chewing gum, the producer of chewing gum will become richer. From my standpoint, the most significant background of an “advanced industrial society” is an increasing profit. The producers of mass consumption become richer, but the consumers become poorer. The system of society exists in one kind of “pacification of existence” in which the producers and the consumers use the same product. For Marcuse, this kind of “reconciliation” between two opposing classes, the producers and the consumers, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, militates against qualitative change (*ODM*, 12).

PACIFICATION OF EXISTENCE

From Marcuse’s perspective, the main effect of an “advanced industrial society” is its ability to block any qualitative change and to

contain all potential agents of qualitative change into one comfortable and satisfying system of domination. In Marcuse's one-dimensional society, the new system of domination creates needs that accept and comply with the system, and in that way, systematically suffocate the need for qualitative social change. For Marcuse, "the new forms of control" which are embodied in technological domination (advertising, mass culture, consumerism) produce needs that contain and stabilize the individuals into the framework of a consumer society: "The very mechanism which ties the individual to his society has changed, and social control is anchored in the new needs which it has produced" (*ODM*, 9).

This one-dimensional society is entrenched in the permanent presence of production, distribution, and repression. Marcuse notices that the productivity is "destructive of the free development of human needs and faculties, its peace maintained by the constant threat of war, its growth dependent on the repression of the real possibilities for pacifying the struggle for existence – individual, national, and international" (*ODM*, ix, x). According to Marcuse, the society which produces high efficiency in production simultaneously produces high efficiency in repression. This repression today is different in comparison to the repression of earlier stages of our society because its work not from "a position of natural and technical immaturity but rather from a position of strength" (*ODM*, x). From Marcuse's view, the intellectual and material capabilities in "advanced industrial society" are immeasurably greater than before, which means that technological domination and the suppression of individuality in the mechanized society are immeasurably greater than before. In this sense, this one-dimensional society, which is organized on the technological base, tends to be "totalitarian." For Marcuse, the term "totalitarian" is not correlated only to "a terroristic political coordination of society," but also more to a specific system of production and distribution which works with the manipulation of needs: "In this society, the productive apparatus tends to become totalitarian to the extent to which it determines not only the socially needed occupations, skills, and attitudes, but also individual needs and aspirations" (*ODM*, xv).

The repression of "advanced industrial society" tends to suffocate the "true" or "vital" needs of man and replace them by "false" needs. Marcuse distinguishes both "true or "vital" needs that are necessary for human life (nourishment, clothing, and lodging), and

“false” needs which are “superimposed upon the individual by particular social interests in his repression: the needs which perpetuate toil, aggressiveness, misery, and injustice” (*ODM*, 5). For Marcuse, “false” needs are unnecessary for human life, and “superimposed” upon the individual by “external powers over which the individual has no control” (*ODM*, 5). In fact, “false” needs are heteronomous in which the individual is manipulated by social interests. For instance, consumer needs for money and property are repressive to the extent that they maintain compliance and satisfaction with them. For this reason, most “false” needs are to have fun, to relax, to love and hate what others love and hate, and to behave and consume as they see in advertisements (*ODM*, 5). For example, if a company imposed a certain type of boots in the market, most people will dress in those types of boots.¹⁴ Or, a car company may offer a new model of car which is much better than the previous model of car because it has one valve more than the previous model. How can we imagine life without that valve? “External power” (in this case a car company) imposes advertisements in a brutal way that conveys to us that we cannot live without a new model of car. From this perspective, that valve of a car is what Slavoj Žižek calls “metastasis of enjoyment.”¹⁵ In sum, the effectiveness of this repression lies in the transplantation of the “false” needs into the “vital” needs with so much success that is very difficult to make distinctions between them: the “vital” needs live in the “false” needs.

For Marcuse, the crucial point is that “false” needs hinder possibilities for happiness and fulfillment of the individual and social potentials: “Their satisfaction might be most gratifying to the individual, but this happiness is not a condition which has to be maintained and protected if it serves to arrest the development of the

¹⁴ As evidence for this example, you can see every day on the streets that people dress in one kind of boots. From my standpoint, this kind of uniformity is one of the main characteristics of a consumer society. The consequence of that kind of fashion, behavior, or “manipulative interests” by “external power” is that the producer, the capitalist, becomes richer, but the consumer becomes poorer. In other words, a conveyor belt has to move because it maintains the productive apparatus and stability of society within the framework of domination. From my view, Charlie Chaplin in his famous movie “Modern Times” is the best way to describe the nature of a consumer society (See scene with a conveyor belt in which Chaplin was crazed by his monotonous work on a conveyor belt, and he was used as a guinea pig to test a machine while he feeds workers as they work).

¹⁵ Slavoj Žižek (1994). *The Metastases of Enjoyment*, New York: Verso.

ability (his own and others) to recognize the disease of the whole and grasp the chances of curing the disease. The result then is euphoria in unhappiness” (*ODM*, 5).

In consumer society, “false” needs produce the “false” expectations of “external powers” that promise to give us genuine fulfillment and satisfaction. For example, advertising a car promises social power and prestige; mass production of clothes promises individuality and style.¹⁶ For Marcuse, this productive apparatus of goods and services is “repressive” because it compels their citizens to mass consumption. “Advanced industrial society” builds its stability and domination within the transformation of “false” needs into “vital” needs which is expressed by a very simple formula: buying + consuming = profit for external power.

Marcuse determines “true” or “vital” needs as an “unqualified claim for satisfaction...-nourishment, clothing, lodging at the attainable level of culture” (*ODM*, 5). The “vital” needs are a precondition for the realization of “*all* needs.” For example, we cannot buy a car, if we did not satisfy our need for hunger. In the context of judgment of needs and their satisfaction, there are “standards of *priority* – standards which refer to the optimal development of the individual, of all individuals, under the optimal utilization of the material and intellectual resources available to man” (*ODM*, 6). For Marcuse, the primary aim is complete satisfaction of the vital needs with a rational use of resources: “The resources are calculable” (*ODM*, 6). A rational use of resources can be calculated in the same way as the government calculates the needs of its budget.¹⁷ For Marcuse, the crucial question is: How can we make a clear distinction between “true” and “false” needs? He suggests an answer: “the question of what is true and false needs must be answered by the individuals themselves” (*ODM*, 6). However, the individuals have to be autonomous and free to the extent that they can make a clear distinction between “true” and “false” needs. As long as the individuals are indoctrinated and manipulated by the productive apparatus of domination, their answers cannot be taken as their own (*ODM*, 6). In other words, only under the condition of freedom from

¹⁶Douglas Kellner (1984). *Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism*, Los Angeles: University of California Press, Berkeley, p.245.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*.

the “superimposed” repressive needs can I determine my needs and decide which needs should be satisfied.

Then, the next question is imposed: “How can the people who have been the object of effective and productive domination by themselves create the conditions of freedom” (*ODM*, 6)? According to Marcuse, I can liberate myself from the prevailing repressive needs only if I become conscious of myself, i.e., conscious that I serve the repressive needs. “Advanced industrial society” tends to suffocate the needs which demand liberation from “false” needs: “the optimal goal is the replacement of false needs by true ones, the abandonment of repressive satisfaction” (*ODM*, 7). In fact, liberation from “false” needs includes denial of all systems of consumption of waste and the affirmation of “true” needs.

Marcuse asserts that “false” needs are shared by all classes of society, which indicates equalization and integration of class distinction within the productive framework of domination. Marcuse continues: “If the worker and his boss enjoy the same television program and visit the same resort places,...if the Negro owns a Cadillac,...then this assimilation indicates not the disappearance of classes, but the extent to which the needs and satisfactions that serve the preservation of the Establishment are shared by the underlying population” (*ODM*,8).

Marcuse’s conclusion is that “false” needs integrate the working class as potential oppositional forces into “advanced industrial society.” In other words, in this way “advanced industrial society” transforms Marx’s revolutionary working class of radical opposition into an incorporative and stabilizing force.

SOCIETY WITHOUT OPPOSITION

To sum up, Marcuse’s apprehension of “pacification of existence” indicates transformation and suspension of the opposition within the established society. “The new forms of control” in “advanced industrial society” are immeasurably more successful than ever before. The success of these controls is grounded on the productive apparatus and the goods and services which produce the stability of the society as a whole. In an “advanced industrial society” there is a presence of repression and production. If society produces efficiency in production, it simultaneously produces highly efficiency in repression. This repression is totalitarian because the economic – technical coordination operates through the manipulation of needs.

In fact, “advanced industrial society” is totalitarian because it is organized on a technological basis. The technical apparatus of production and distribution functions not as an isolated instrument from the social effects, but rather as a system of domination which determines, organizes, and perpetuates social relationships and individual needs. “True” needs are suffocated and replaced by “false” needs within the framework of technological domination. When people’s needs are satisfied, their reason for protest is removed, and they become passive instrument in the chain of technological domination. According to Marcuse, the technology is repressive because it creates an “affluent society” which refutes any possibility for a qualitative social change. From my view, this repression is not necessarily totalitarian because it can be maintained through political controls. Or rather, the power of this repression can be mastered by the political-decision making process. According to Habermas, the political-decision making process can be achieved only through “dialogue,” which is “discussion free from domination.”¹⁸

Marcuse also believes in the possibility of a social change. At the end of *One-Dimensional Man*, he writes: “The unification of opposites in the medium of technological rationality must be, *in all its reality*, an illusory unification, which eliminates neither the contradiction between the growing productivity and its repressive use, nor the vital need for solving the contradiction” (*ODM*, 256). Marcuse continues to believe that social conflicts and tendencies toward a social change exist in the established society. In other words, the people have to be the force of social change, but not the force of social cohesion. However, Marcuse does not give any evidence about the possibility and modes of a social change, but he only claims that “the historical extremes may meet again: the most advanced consciousness of humanity and its most exploited forces. It is nothing but a chance. The critical theory of society possesses no concepts which could bridge the gap between the present and its future” (*ODM*, 257).

From my standpoint, technology can liberate human potentialities by providing free time for the satisfaction of vital needs. For example, *techne* in ancient Greece was an art, and people could freely enjoy experiences of the art. Unfortunately, an “advanced industrial society” suppresses the individual’s creative potentiality

¹⁸ Jürgen Habermas, *op.cit.*, p.61. For Habermas, it has to be the mediation between technology and the conduct of life through political “dialogue.”

within the technological progress. The repressive technological apparatus compels their citizens to consume which became a way of life. When consumption becomes a way of life, the technological apparatus maintains the status quo between two opposing classes. In this context, the pattern of human-cultural development is determined by the power of technical control over the passive adaptation of citizens to the institutional framework. The subjection of citizens to the apparatus of production and self-sustaining economic growth keep citizens in increasing comfort and liberates their freedom within the system. However, from my view, free time and freedom can exist only if technology becomes an independent or neutral force in our society. According to Habermas, “rationalization” in the institutional framework can occur only through “removing restrictions on communication,” i.e., in an “unrestricted discussion.”¹⁹

Marcuse finished his book *One-Dimensional Man* with these words: “At the beginning of the fascist era, Walter Benjamin wrote: It is only for the sake of those without hope that hope is given to us” (*ODM*, 257).

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¹⁹ Ibid., p.118.

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